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Corporate social irresponsibility is always viewed as the opposite side of 
corporate social responsibility. Recent studies have noticed that firms could be 
social responsible and social irresponsible simultaneously. More specifically, 
firms may behave social responsibly to compensate for the negative effect of 
corporate social irresponsible (CSiR) incidents. While previous studies did 
note the interesting phenomena, we have limited knowledge on: which firms 
are likely to do so, and, to what extent, corporate social responsibility could 
offset the negative effect of CSiR incidents. To answer the research questions, 
I propose two interrelated studies to understand the dynamic between 
corporate social responsibility and corporate social irresponsibility.  
The study one investigates what factors lead firms to use corporate 
philanthropy, a component of CSR, to offset the illegitimacy caused by CSiR 
incidents. I focus on the two demands during the legitimacy repair process: 
stakeholders’ demand that the firm’s internal operations be changed after 
CSiR incidents and top managers’ resistance to change. I argue that corporate 
philanthropy after CSiR incidents serves as an impression management tactic 
to reconcile the demands of stakeholders and internal managers. Corporate 
philanthropy could pacify stakeholders by deflecting their attention from 
socially irresponsible incidents—but because it is unlikely to change the firm’s 
internal operations and power dynamics, it is acceptable to internal managers. 
A firm’s incentive to increase corporate philanthropy after CSiR incidents 
depends on the pressures of stakeholders and internal managers. I find that a 
firm is more likely to use corporate philanthropy to restore the legitimacy lost 
by CSiR incidents when there is higher resource dependence between the firm 
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and the stakeholders involved in the CSiR incident and when top managers are 
more reluctant to change.  
In the study two, I examine the performance implications of increasing 
CSR after CSiR incidents. Corporate philanthropy is increasingly adopted by 
firms as a response to CSiR incidents (Muller & Kräussl, 2011). However, 
previous studies have made two competing arguments about the effect of 
corporate philanthropy. While some argue that it helps to offset CSiR’s 
negative influence on firm performance, others suggest that it can backfire. I 
argue that whether CSiR would amplify or dampen the negative relationship 
between CSiR incidents and firm performance depends on the institutional 
logics audiences embedded in. I focus on two institutional logics: the 
shareholder logic and the stakeholder logic. Since the two have different 
beliefs about the firm’s objective and evaluation criteria for legitimacy, 
audiences embedded in the two institutional logics diverge on their 
interpretation of corporate philanthropy after CSiR incidents. I find that 
corporate philanthropy amplifies the negative effect on firm performance of 
shareholder-related CSiR incidents, while it dampens the negative effect on 
firm performance of stakeholder-related environment-related CSiR incidents.  
I tested in the arguments in the study one and the study two using 
Fortune 500 data from 1991 to 2006. The findings in this thesis have 
implications for literature on corporate social irresponsibility, corporate social 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Corporate social irresponsibility (CSI) refers to “the set of corporate actions 
that negatively affects an identifiable social stakeholders’ legitimate claims” 
(Strike, Gao, & Bansal, 2006:852). Because corporate socially irresponsible 
(CSiR) incidents, such as product-safety issues (Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & 
Shapiro, 2012), financial restatement (Desai, 2011), or employee 
discrimination lawsuits (James & Wooten,  2006), violate the legitimate 
claims of certain stakeholders, firms risk losing endorsements and support 
from resource providers. Indeed, ample evidence from empirical studies shows 
that CSiR behavior leads to financial losses (see Margolis & Walsh, 2003, for 
a review), employee turnover (Authaud-Day, Certo, Dalton & Dalton, 2006), 
customer boycotts (McDonnell & King, 2013), and stock-price deterioration 
(Palmrose, Richardson, & Scholz, 2004). For instance, in a study by Palmrose, 
Richardson, and Scholz (2004) of  403 restatements announced from 1995 
to 1999, the firms’ stock prices dropped by an average of roughly 9% in the 
two days after announcing restatement. Recent studies even note that the 
negative effect of CSI on firm performance is stronger than the positive effect 
of corporate social responsibility (CSR) Doh, Howton, Howton, & Siegel, 
2009; Frooman, 1997; Muller & Kräussl, 2011).  
Despite the strong negative effect of CSI on an organization, our 
understanding of CSI is quite limited. Current CSR studies tend to assume that 
CSI is the reverse side of CSR, viewing it as the failure to act in a socially 
responsible manner. Empirically, the literature usually calculates CSI as a 
negative score of CSR and aggregates it with the positive score of CSR to get 
an overall measurement of CSR (Waddock & Graves, 1997; Orlizky, Schmidt, 
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& Rynes, 2003; Barnett & Saloman, 2012). This aggregation method fails to 
recognize that socially responsible actions are not necessarily the opposite of 
irresponsible actions (Strike, Gao, & Bansal, 2006). For instance, violence 
against employees is irresponsible, but the absence of violence is not 
necessarily responsible; it should be the status quo (Strike, Gao, & Bansal, 
2006). Moreover, while corporate philanthropy could be regarded as socially 
responsible behavior, firms that refuse to donate to social welfare are not 
necessarily socially irresponsible. Therefore, CSR and CSI are not two ends of 
the same continuum (Kotchen & Moon, 2011; Mattingly & Berman, 2006; 
Strike, Gao, & Bansal, 2006; Oikonomou, Brooks, & Pavelin, 2012); they are 
two related but independent constructs. As a result, instead of treating CSR 
and CSI as two sides of the same coin, CSR and CSI are subject to different 
dynamics and should be examined separately. 
Recent studies have begun to recognize that CSI coexists with CSR. 
Strike, Gao, and Bansal (2006) find that international diversification leads to 
both CSR and CSI, suggesting that firms can simultaneously be responsible 
and irresponsible toward stakeholders. Recent studies have also noted that for 
some firms, CSR serves as a strategy to mitigate the negative influence of 
CSiR(Godfrey, 2005; Godfrey, Merrill, & Hansen, 2009; Koh, Qian, &Wang, 
2014). Godfrey (2005) suggests that CSR provides an insurance-like benefit 
for firms that have practiced CSI. In another study, Godfrey and his colleague 
(2009) find that firms with higher prior CSR suffer less from CSiR incidents 
compared to firms with lower prior CSR. Beside its ex ante buffering role for 
CSI, CSR may also serve as an ex post remedy strategy for CSI. Firms may 
engage in CSR behaviors to restore the illegitimacy caused by CSI (Kotchen 
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& Moon, 2011; Muller & Kräussl, 2011). For instance, Muller and Kräussl 
(2011) find that companies with a poor social reputation were more likely to 
make disaster-relief donations after Hurricane Katrina than companies with a 
positive social reputation.  
Despite progress in understanding CSI and its dynamics with regard to 
CSR, several questions still exist. First, among the few studies that examine 
the link between CSR and CSI, most studies focus on the effect of CSR ex 
ante CSI, overlooking CSR ex post CSI. Recently, some studies have noticed 
that CSR could also serve as an ex post remedy strategy for CSI. Firms may 
engage in CSR behaviors to offset the illegitimacy caused by CSI (Kotchen & 
Moon, 2011; Muller & Kräussl, 2011). However, our understanding of CSR 
ex ante CSI is quite limited. We are unclear about why firms employ CSR as a 
remedy strategy, which types of firms are most likely to employ this strategy, 
and whether and how this strategy could remedy the negative effect of CSI on 
firm performance. Without answering these questions, our understanding of 
the linkage between CSR and CSI is incomplete.  
Second, CSI literature either focuses on a specific type of CSiR 
incident, such as financial restatement, product recall, or environmental 
pollution, or aggregate different types or dimensions of CSiR incidents into 
the same category. These two methods of handling CSiR incidents lead to 
several problems. Focusing on a specific type of CSiR incident constrains the 
generalizability of the findings across different types of CSiR incidents. For 
instance, we are unclear whether the findings based on financial restatement 
apply to those based on employee discrimination. On the other hand, 
aggregating different types or dimensions of CSiR incidents into the same 
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category ignores the variance among different components or dimensions 
within CSR or CSI. Studies have recognized that CSR can be decomposed into 
different dimensions, such as people and products (Johnson, & Greening, 
1999), or stakeholder management and social issues (Hillman & Keim, 2001), 
and these different types of CSR may have divergent outcomes on firm 
performance. Therefore, in this thesis, I have classified CSiR incidents into 
different types to capture the variance among different types of CSI.   
In addition to its contributions to our understanding of CSI and its link 
to CSR, this study also aims to address two issues in the legitimacy-repair 
literature. First, previous studies have tended to highlight demand from 
external stakeholders after illegitimate behavior (Suchman, 1995; Pfarrer, 
Decelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008), overlooking the demand from internal 
managers. To restore legitimacy from the standpoint of external stakeholders, 
firms may change organizational structures (Suchman, 1995; Cowen & Marcel, 
2011; Kang, 2008; Authaud-Day, Certo, Dalton, & Dalton, 2006), or engage 
in internal change to repair the damage to legitimacy (Pferrer et al.,2008; 
Zavylova et al., 2012). These repair strategies lead to changes in top 
management composition, organizational structure, or operating systems. 
However, internal managers are generally reluctant to change (Henderson & 
Clark, 1991), thereby resisting change caused by legitimacy repair. Studies in 
impression management find that resistance from internal mangers may force 
firms to symbolically adopt a new practice without actually implementing it 
(Westphal & Zajac, 1994, 1998, 2001). Given the important role top managers 
play in a firm’s decision-making process, ignoring the agency of internal 
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managers may prevent us from gaining a clear picture of a firm’s choices for 
legitimacy repair.  
Second, while theoretical papers suggest that firms employ CSR as a 
strategy to repair legitimacy loss caused by CSiR incidents, to what extent 
CSR can offset illegitimacy has not been determined empirically. Previous 
studies have tended to draw different interpretations of CSR after CSI. Some 
studies tend to view CSR after CSiR incidents as a firm’s strategy to 
communicate to external stakeholders their determination to change (Pfarrer et 
al., 2008). The majority takes the second approach. They view CSR after CSiR 
incidents as an impression management tactic to deflect stakeholders’ 
attention from CSiR to norm-conforming behaviors (Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, 
& Shapiro, 2012). While the first perspective suggests that CSR could offset 
illegitimacy caused by CSiR incidents, the latter would suggest the opposite. I 
attempt to reconcile the debate by examining under what conditions 
stakeholders are more likely to interpret CSR after CSiR as an impression 
management tactic and under what conditions as evidence that the firm intends 
to change.  
My dissertation is motivated by and seeks to address the four issues 
identified in CSR and legitimacy-repair literature. I examine two interrelated 
research questions and answer them in two essays. The first essay investigates 
what factors lead firms to use corporate philanthropy, a component of CSR, to 
offset the illegitimacy caused by CSiR incidents. I focus on the two demands 
during the legitimacy-repair process: stakeholders’ demand that the firm’s 
internal operations be changed after CSiR incidents and top managers’ 
resistance to change. I argue that corporate philanthropy after CSiR incidents 
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serves as an impression management tactic to reconcile the demands of 
stakeholders and internal managers. Corporate philanthropy could pacify 
stakeholders by deflecting their attention from socially irresponsible 
incidents—but because it is unlikely to change the firm’s internal operations 
and power dynamics, it is acceptable to internal managers. A firm’s incentive 
to increase corporate philanthropy after CSiR incidents depends on the 
pressures of stakeholders and internal managers. Using data on the CSiR 
incidents and corporate philanthropy for Fortune 500 firms from 1996 to 2005, 
I find that a firm is more likely to use corporate philanthropy to restore the 
legitimacy lost by CSiR incidents when there is higher resource dependence 
between the firm and the stakeholders involved in the CSiR incident and when 
top managers are more reluctant to change.  
In the second essay, I examine the performance implications of 
increasing CSR after CSI. Corporate philanthropy is increasingly adopted by 
firms as a response to CSiR incidents (Muller & Kräussl, 2011). However, 
previous studies have made two competing arguments about the effect of 
corporate philanthropy. While some argue that it helps to offset CSiR’s 
negative influence on firm performance, others suggest that it can backfire. I 
argue that whether CSiR would amplify or dampen the negative relationship 
between CSiR incidents and firm performance depends on the institutional 
logic audiences embedded in. I focus on two institutional logics: shareholder 
logic and stakeholder logic. Since the two have different beliefs about the 
firm’s objective and evaluation criteria for legitimacy, audiences embedded in 
the two institutional logics diverge on their interpretation of corporate 
philanthropy after CSiR incidents. Using Fortune 500 data from 1991 to 2006, 
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I find that corporate philanthropy amplifies the negative effect on firm 
performance of shareholder-related CSiR incidents, while it dampens the 
negative effect on firm performance of stakeholder-related environment-





Essay One: Corporate Philanthropy after Corporate Socially 
Irresponsible Incidents: An Impression Management Tactic 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate socially irresponsible incidents violate stakeholders’ 
expectation that social norms will be conformed to and place the firm’s 
legitimacy at risk (Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Shapiro, 2012). When a 
firm’s legitimacy is threatened by CSiR practices, the firm is under pressure to 
repair legitimacy and mitigate the negative influence of CSiR. The legitimacy-
repair literature suggests that the firm should appoint monitors and watchdogs 
to guard against future recidivism (Suchman, 1995; Gangloff, Connelly, & 
Shook, 2014); dismiss the CEO (Hazarika, Karpoff, & Nahata, 2012; 
Wiersema, & Zhang, 2013), top executives (Authaud-Day, Certo, Dalton, & 
Dalton, 2006), or directors (Cowen & Marcel, 2011 Kang, 2008; Authaud-
Day, Certo, Dalton, & Dalton, 2006) to distance the firm from bad influences; 
or engage in internal structural change (Pfarrer et al., 2008; Zavylova et al. 
2012) to rehabilitate its legitimacy.  
 An emerging stream of studies notes that firms employ corporate 
philanthropy, a component of CSR, to restore losses after CSiR incidents 
(Muller & Kräussl, 2011; McDonnell & King, 2013). Firms employ corporate 
philanthropy as a strategic tool to offset the illegitimacy of CSiR (Muller & 
Kräussal, 2011; Kotchen & Moon, 2011). For instance, Muller & Kräussl 
(2011) found that, after Hurricane Katrina, firms that had a reputation for 
irresponsible practices were more likely to make a donation after the disaster. 
Firms faced with customer boycotts tend to increase disclosure of corporate 
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philanthropy, a typical prosocial claim, to restore or protect their image (Rao, 
Yue, & Ingram, 2011; McDonnell & King, 2013). Despite evidence that firms 
use corporate philanthropy to repair the illegitimacy of CSiR incidents, we 
know little about the conditions that lead firms to use this legitimacy-repair 
strategy, given the high cost of corporate philanthropy. We lack a theory that 
addresses why and how firms use corporate philanthropy to offset the 
illegitimacy of CSiR incidents. 
Previous literature on legitimacy repair tends to highlight demands 
from external stakeholders, paying less attention to the agency or resistance of 
internal managers. Ecology literature and strategic-change literature suggest 
that internal managers are subject to organizational inertia and thus reluctant 
to change (Henderson & Clark, 1991; Smith & Tushman, 2005). However, the 
major legitimacy-repair strategies identified in the literature lead to changes in 
a firm’s organizational structure, power structure, or operating systems. For 
instance, adding a watchdog (Suchman, 1995) or displacing top executives 
(Zhang & Wiersma, 2009 )may change the remaining top executives’ 
composition and the firm’s power structure, while internal changes may 
involve adopting new technology, cultivating a new organizational culture, or 
repositioning firm strategy (Pfarrer et al., 2008; Zavylova et al., 2012). As a 
result, internal managers, who are committed to the status quo, may prefer a 
legitimacy strategy that is unlikely to change the firm’s internal operations. 
Without considering the internal manager’s perspective, the literature on 
legitimacy repair captures an incomplete picture. 
In this study, I consider both external stakeholders and internal 
managers by developing a framework for how corporate philanthropy can 
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reconcile the conflicting demands of the two parties after CSiR incidents. This 
theoretical framework draws on an impression management perspective to 
inform our understanding of legitimacy repair by highlighting the agency of 
internal managers (Oliver, 1991). I propose that corporate philanthropy after 
CSiR incidents serves as an impression management tactic to reconcile the 
demands of stakeholders and the resistance of internal managers. Corporate 
philanthropy may pacify stakeholders by deflecting their attention from 
socially irresponsible incidents to more socially desirable behaviors and 
mitigate pressure for change. At the same time, corporate philanthropy is 
acceptable to internal managers, since it is less likely to change the firm’s 
internal operations or power dynamics (Brammer, Pavelin, & Porter, 2009; 
Brammer & Millington, 2008). A firm’s tendency to increase corporate 
philanthropy after CSiR incidents depends on the degree of pressure from 
stakeholders and resistance from internal managers. Using the CSiR incidents 
and corporate philanthropy data of Fortune 500 firms from 1996 to 2005, I 
find that firms are more likely to use corporate philanthropy to compensate for 
CSiR incidents when firms have high dependence on the stakeholders 
involved in the CSiR incidents and when top managers are more resistant to 
change.  
This study contributes to our understanding of legitimacy repair, CSR, 
and CSI in several ways. First, it enriches the legitimacy-repair literature by 
linking impression management research to legitimacy-repair studies. Previous 
studies on legitimacy repair have always focused on how firms meet the 
requirements of external stakeholders (Suchman, 1995; Arthaud-Day, Certo, 
Dalton, & Dalton, 2006), while overlooking the demands of internal managers, 
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and how the agency of top managers impacts a firm’s strategy to repair 
legitimacy. Second, this study contributes to those that have attempted to 
establish a link between CSR and CSI. Although a few studies have noted that 
firms may increase CSR after CSI to repair illegitimacy caused by CSiR 
incidents, it is unclear why and how firms select this strategy. I address this 
question by drawing on an insight from impression management literature. I 
argue that firms are most likely to increase corporate philanthropy after CSiR 
incidents when the incidents are related to shareholders and when top 
managers have longer organizational tenure.  
Third, this study adds to the small but growing literature on CSI. 
Instead of aggregating different dimensions of CSI in a single construct, I 
unpack CSI into five types based on stakeholder theory and demonstrate how a 
firm’s response varies across different types of CSiR incidents. I thus echo the 
call to pay attention to the specific components of CSR (Strike et al., 2006) 
and extend it to CSI literature.  
Fourth, this study also enriches our understanding of corporate 
philanthropy. As with other dimensions of CSR, such as adopting clean 
technology or committing to equal treatment of employees, corporate 
philanthropy demonstrates the firm’s conformity to social norms. It is always 
externally oriented, and has a limited effect on the firm’s internal operations. 
Although previous literature has noted this unique feature of corporate 
philanthropy, the implications of its uniqueness are unclear. I propose that 
because corporate philanthropy has only a limited effect on a firm’s internal 
operations, it is preferred by internal managers who are committed to the 
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status quo. Firms are most likely to adopt this strategy to respond to external 
pressure when top managers have longer organizational tenure. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHEIESIS 
Internal and external demands during legitimacy repair after CSiR 
CSiR incidents place stakeholders at risk and violate their expectation 
of conformity to social norms (Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Shapiro, 2012). 
For instance, product-safety problems put consumers’ health at risk and 
violate their expectation that businesses should offer safe products (Carroll, 
1979). Financial misrepresentation, another widely studied CSiR activity, 
reduces shareholder benefit by misusing facts and misinterpreting accounting 
rules (Arthadu-Day et al., 2006). Because CSiR incidents violate the social 
norms hold by stakeholders, stakeholders tend to view firms that experience 
CSiR incidents as illegitimate.  
When a firm’s legitimacy is threatened by CSiR practices, firms are 
more likely to take action to defend their legitimacy and thereby ensure access 
to key resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). One of the primary ways is by 
changing the organizational structure. Suchman (1995) suggests two ways to 
restructure: by appointing a monitor and watchdog and by disassociation. In 
the first type of restructuring, a firm changes its oversight structure to 
demonstrate a commitment to preventing recurrence of the CSiR incident 
(Suchman, 1995); for instance, a firm can install a watchdog that is not 
associated with the existing top management team after a financial restatement 
(Gangloff, Connelly, & Shook, 2014). Also, a firm can replace executives 
(Arthaud-Day, Certo, Dalton, & Dalton, 2006) to signal that limited aspects of 
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its operations were flawed and show how it has acted to remedy those faults 
(Suchman, 1995: 598). By doing so, the firm attempts to dissociate from the 
negative impact of CSiR. Recent studies on financial restatement find that the 
turnover rates of CEOs and CFOs in firms with financial restatement are about 
two times higher than their counterparts in firms without financial restatement 
(Authaud-Day et al., 2006). In addition to the two strategies suggested by 
Suchman(1995), firms may engage in organizational change, such as adopting 
green technology, redesigning the organizational structure, or reforming the 
internal operating system (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993; Zavylova et al., 2012) to 
directly repair legitimacy damage (Pferrer et al., 2008).   
Legitimacy-repair strategies in the literature (Suchman, 1995; Pferrer 
et al., 2008; Hazarika, Karpoff, & Nahata, 2012; Cowen & Marcel, 2011; 
Kang, 2008; Authaud-Day, Certo, Dalton, & Dalton, 2006; Zavylvoa et al., 
2012) mainly focus on how to respond to external pressure and overlook 
resistance from top managers, who are generally reluctant to change. Top 
managers are usually subject to organizational inertia and committed to the 
firm’s existing strategy, structure, technology, staffing, or reward policies 
(Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & Fredrickson, 1993), even when the firm is in crisis 
(Starbuck, Greve, & Hedberg, 1978). However, these three actions—inviting 
watchdogs, replacing top executives, and internal change—may alter the 
firm’s internal power structure. Replacing executives and changing the 
oversight structure threatens the career security of managers who are 
responsible for CSiR incidents. Internal changes can include changes in 
management, reward structures, and codes of conduct, leading to internal 
operating changes and challenging the existing power structure within firms. 
14 
 
For instance, rebuilding existing environmental technology could empower 
top managers with expertise in environmental protection. Therefore, compared 
to the three strategies mainly discussed in the legitimacy-repair literature, top 
managers would prefer strategies that could avoid changes to internal 
operations or power structures. 
Demands from different forces make unilateral conformity to one 
institution’s demand difficult, because the satisfaction of one often requires 
firms to ignore or defy the demands of others. Oliver’s 1991 study provides a 
theoretical framework for a firm’s strategic response to competing demands. 
She suggests that firms may achieve legitimacy through manipulative or even 
deceptive actions that aim to show compliance to external observers while 
concealing nonconformity. Firms may respond to competing pressures from 
different sources by loosely decoupling their activities. Studies in impression 
management further elaborate on how firms feign conformity while 
maintaining discretion over actual practices. Westphal and Zajac (1998, 2001) 
find that some firms will announce that they intend to adopt a long-term 
incentive plan for a CEO—and thus gain symbolic legitimacy—but not 
actually implement it. Westphal and Graebner (2010) further suggest that in 
some cases, firms implement externally visible policies and structures that 
appear to conform to prevailing normative prescriptions, while actual 
governance practices remain unchanged. For instance, firms appoint 
independent directors who lack visible contractual ties to the firm but who 
nevertheless have friendship ties to its executives, to show conformity to 
external demands for high board independence—while the actual level of 
independence is unchanged.	 Accordingly, in response to pressures from 
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different actors, firms may selectively engage in superficial practices to show 
conformity instead of changing embedded practices. 
In this study, I build on an impression management perspective to 
examine strategies for legitimacy repair. I explore how corporate philanthropy 
after CSiR incidents can serve as an impression management tactic to 
reconcile the demands of stakeholders and internal managers. I also determine 
which firms are more likely to adopt corporate philanthropy to repair 
legitimacy.  
Corporate philanthropy as an impression management tactic 
Impression management literature refers to symbolic practices or 
actions as those that increase the legitimacy of a firm’s behavior with external 
constituents without causing substantive changes in the firm’s actual practices 
(Westphal & Grabner, 2010). Because the symbolic practices or actions are 
highly visible actions that are consistent with social expectations (Ashforth & 
Gibbs, 1990: 181), they help to promote the impression that the firm’s 
activities are consistent with the values and expectations of its stakeholders. 
Therefore, they have the potential to positively alter impressions about the 
firm and deflect media and stakeholders’ attention away from the causes of 
wrongdoing (Zavyalova et al., 2012).  
Corporate philanthropy is a component of CSR. It refers to gifts given 
by corporations to social and charitable causes, such as support for education, 
culture, or the arts; minorities or health care; or relief funds for victims of 
natural disasters (Godfrey 2005, Seifert et al., 2004). It extends beyond areas 
that are directly associated with a firm’s economic activities or legal 
requirements, and signals that the firm is a good corporate citizen who is 
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concerned about social welfare and serves as evidence of its responsibility 
(Marquis, Glynn, & Davis, 2007) .  
Since corporate philanthropy is a highly visible action that is consistent 
with social expectations (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990: 181), it signals a firm’s 
conformity and commitment to norms, enhances its social reputation 
(Brammer & Millington, 2005), and strengthens its relationships with key 
stakeholders (Hillman and Keim, 2001). Empirical studies also show that 
stakeholders, such as employees, customers, and investors, are more likely to 
feel positive about being associated with firms that are more socially active 
(Wang & Choi, 2008). For example, employees are more likely to work in 
socially responsible firms and show greater commitment (Dutton et al., 1994). 
Customers tend to show a higher level of satisfaction with the firm’s products 
and services (Lev, Petrovits, & Radhakrishnan, 2010). Socially reponsible 
investors tend to select firms with high social performance. Therefore, 
corporate philanthropy plays a key role in shaping the positive perception of a 
firm in the eyes of external stakeholders (Porter & Kramer, 2002). 
Because corporate philanthropy shows a firm’s concern for social 
welfare and conformity to social norms (Marquis, Glynn, & Davis, 2007), it 
dilutes the negative information and negative attentions associated with CSiR 
practices (McDonnell & King, 2013) and deflects media and stakeholder 
attention away from less admirable activities and CSiR incidents (Zavyalova 
et al., 2012; Marquis & Toffel, 2013). For instance, increasing publicity about 
a firm’s prosocial programs dilutes media attention to boycotts against the 
firm (McDonnell & King, 2012). For manufacturers whose products are 
alleged to cause breast cancer, adorning their products with pink ribbons to 
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convey their support for breast cancer research may partially deflect attention 
from their product-safety problems (Marquis & Toffel, 2013). By deflecting 
attention from socially irresponsible incidents, firms pacify stakeholders and 
mitigate external pressures. Therefore, corporate philanthropy could help firms 
cope with external pressure after CSiR incidents.  
While corporate philanthropy demonstrates its conformity to social 
norms to external stakeholders and helps deflect negative attention, it has 
limited influence on a firm’s internal operations. Corporate philanthropy is 
always oriented toward externals and not closely related to a firm’s 
operational aspects (Brammer, Pavelin, & Porter, 2009; Brammer & 
Millington, 2008). Since corporate philanthropy is not among a firm’s required 
daily activities, it is unlikely to impact the firm’s operations. Although it may 
influence corporate cash flow, and sometimes leads to the establishment of a 
corporate foundation, it is unlikely to change the firm’s existing strategies, 
organizational structure, or human resources policies.  
In conclusion, corporate philanthropy can demonstrate conformity to 
external stakeholders without causing substantive changes in the actual 
practices of the firm (Westphal & Grabner, 2010). Therefore, firms tend to use 
corporate philanthropy to compensate for CSiR incidents to balance the 
demands of external stakeholders and internal managers. Empirical studies 
also show that an increasing number of firms increase prosocial activities after 
negative events. For instance, McDonnell and King (2013) found that firms 
tend to increase their disclosure of social actions after they become the target 




H1: Firms that experience more CSiRs incidents are more likely to 
increase corporate philanthropy. 
Pressure from external stakeholders 
While firms tend to use corporate philanthropy as a strategy to repair 
legitimacy, their tendency to adopt such a strategy is contingent on their 
dependence on the sources of external pressure. Resource dependence theory 
suggests that how a firm will respond to external pressure can be predicted 
based on its dependence on the constituents who exert pressure (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). In DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) seminal paper, they also 
argue that conformity with the institutional environment will be a function of 
external dependence. Therefore, when a CSiR incident hurts a particular 
stakeholder’s legitimate claim, how the firm responds to the incident will be 
influenced by the resource interdependence between the firm and the 
stakeholder. Firms are more likely respond to CSiR incidents when they have 
higher dependence on stakeholders whose legitimate claims have been 
negatively affected.  
I will focus on five external stakeholders: shareholders, customers, 
suppliers, employees, and the local community. These groups have been 
identified as a firm’s primary stakeholders in stakeholder theory literature 
(Clarkson, 1995; Hillman & Keim, 2001; Freeman, 1984). Although the five 
stakeholders are vital to a firm’s survival and continuing profitability, they 
vary in their resource dependence relationships with the firm. 
To measure a firm’s dependence on different external stakeholders, I 
followed the framework developed by Frooman (1992). Based on the 
resource-dependence relationship between a firm and its stakeholders, 
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Frooman divided resource relationships into four categories: stakeholder 
power, firm power, low interdependence, and high interdependence. The four 
categories of interdependence relationship and examples of stakeholders in 
each category are shown in Table 1. 
Stakeholder power occurs when the stakeholder is less dependent on 
the firm than the firm is on the stakeholder (Frooman, 1992); two examples 
are customers and shareholders. Firms are highly dependent on customers and 
shareholders for sales revenue and capital, respectively. However, in 
competitive product and capital markets, customers and shareholders have the 
right to vote with their feet, and can shift to a firm’s competitors if the focal 
firm expropriates their benefits and breaches social norms.  
Firm power is present when the stakeholder is more dependent on the 
firm than the firm is on the stakeholder. Two examples are employees and 
suppliers. Sharma and Henriques (2005) suggest that the dependence 
relationship between a firm and its employees depends on employee 
characteristics. While managers are unique and valuable resources for the firm, 
junior employees can easily be replaced in the labor market. In the cases 
examined here, employees are disadvantaged individuals who are 
discriminated against by firms, work in unsafe environments, or are illegally 
laid off. Similarly, suppliers tend to be smaller than the Fortune 500 firms I am 
examining, and therefore the proportion of a supplier’s business represented 
by the firm is larger than the proportion of the firm’s business represented by 




High interdependency and low interdependency occur when there is 
symmetry in the exchange relationship—either both parties are highly 
dependent on each other or neither party is highly dependent on the other 
(Frooman, 1992). For instance, a local community may need the firm’s 
cooperation on ecological and social issues and can pressure the firm about its 
environmental and social impacts through regulatory hearings and protests, or 
withhold a license to operate (Sharma & Henriques, 2005). When residents in 
the local community are actively involved in ecological and social issues, the 
resource relationship between the local community and firms is one of high 
interdependency. If local residents are passive on these issues, their resource 
relationship is one of low interdependency.  
 























Revised based on Frooman(1992) 
 
Based on the typology of resource-dependence relationships, I argue 
that firms have higher dependence on shareholders and customers than on the 
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local community, employees, or suppliers. As a result, they are more likely to 
respond to CSiR incidents that are associated with shareholders or customers 
by repairing the loss of legitimacy. Without the resources supplied by 
shareholders and customers, firms are at a higher risk of failure. They are 
more likely to increase their corporate philanthropy to demonstrate their 
concern for social welfare and conformity to social norms. By doing so, they 
hope to deflect attention from their irresponsible behavior and mitigate the 
negative effects of illegitimacy.  
Compared to CSiR incidents that are related to shareholders and 
customers, firms are less likely or even unlikely to respond to CSiR incidents 
associated with employees, suppliers, or the local community. Even if 
employees or suppliers withhold resources after employee- or supplier-related 
CsiR incidents, firms could easily find replacements in the labor or product 
markets. Therefore, they are less motivated to repair legitimacy loss caused by 
CSiR incidents related to employees and suppliers. As a result, they are less 
motivated to use corporate philanthropy to deflect attention from these types 
of CSiR incidents. Since interdependency relationships exist between firms 
and local communities, I argue that a firm’s response to community-related 
CSiR incidents would be less proactive than incidents related to shareholders 
or customers, and the firm would be less likely to increase corporate 
philanthropy after a community-related CSiR incidents. 
Therefore, 
H2: Firms are more likely to increase corporate philanthropy after 
shareholder- and customer-related CSiR incidents than after supplier-, 
employee-, or local community-related CSiR incidents.  
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Resistance from internal mangers 
The discussion in the above section mainly focuses on responding to 
external pressure. I argue that firms are more likely to respond to external 
pressure when they have high dependence on the stakeholders involved in 
CSiR incidents. Because corporate philanthropy could show conformity to 
social welfare and restore legitimacy, firms would increase corporate 
philanthropy to respond to external pressure. In the section, I will discuss how 
resistance from internal managers further leads to the selection of this 
response strategy. 
Studies in the impression management literature have found that 
resistance from internal managers causes firms to loosely decouple ceremonial 
conformity from internal activities (Oliver, 1991; Meyer & Rowen, 1977). 
This resistance from internal managers may force firm to use impression 
management tactics to respond to external pressure and gain legitimacy 
without changing any actual practices within the firm. By doing so, internal 
managers can maintain their influence over the firm. For instance, Westphal 
and Graebner (2010) find that when firms are under pressure to increase board 
independence, the resistance from internal managers can cause firms to 
appoint independent directors who lack visible contractual ties to the firm but 
who nevertheless have friendship ties to executives. Appointing superficially 
independent directors gives the appearance of acceding to external demands 
for high board independence. However, as these directors have friendship ties 
to top managers, those managers’ control of the board remains unchanged.	 I 
argue that when resistance from top managers is high, firms are more likely to 
employ impression management tactics to respond to external pressure while, 
at the same time, declining to change internal operations.  
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Resistance to change and commitment to the status quo  is likely to be 
associated with long organizational tenure. Studies of top management teams 
have found that organizational tenure affects top managers’ cognition. Top 
managers with longer organizational tenures are more rigid and committed to 
established policies and practices (Katz, 1982). Hambrick, Geletkanycz, and 
Fredrickson (1993) show that long-tenured executives are significantly more 
committed to the status quo than executives with shorter tenure. Moreover, top 
management teams with longer tenure tend to have high social cohension, 
leading to stronger resistance to changes in the status quo (Michel & 
Hambrick, 1992). In addition, top managers with long tenure have a better 
understanding of organizational policies and procedures (Michel & Hambrick, 
1992), and thus have higher commitment to the existing structure and 
operating systems.  
As top managers with longer organizational tenure are more committed 
to the status quo, they are more resistant to changes within the firm and 
unlikely to initiate changes in a firm’s structure, operating system, or strategy. 
For instance, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) and Wiersems and Bantel 
(1992) find a negative relationship between top management’s organizational 
tenure and strategic change. Miller (1991) found that top executives with 
longer tenure are unlikely to change their firm’s organizational structure to 
adapt to changes in the external environment.  
Top managers with longer organizational tenure are more likely to 
adopt corporate philanthropy as a response strategy and facilitate an increase 
in corporate philanthropy after CSiR incidents. Previous studies have shown 
that corporate philanthropy is always oriented toward externals and not closely 
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related to the operational aspects of a firm (Brammer, Pavelin, & Porter, 2009; 
Brammer & Millington, 2008). As increasing corporate philanthropy is 
unlikely to change a firm’s internal operations or procedures, top managers 
who are committed to the status quo tend to prefer this strategy and to increase 
corporate philanthropy after CSiR incidents.  
Therefore,  
H3: The longer the top managers’ tenure, the more the firm will 
increase corporate philanthropy after shareholder- and customer-related 
CSiR incidents than after supplier-, customer-, or local community-related 
CSiR incidents.   
DATA AND METHOD 
Sample selection 
The sample is Fortune 500 firms between 1996 and 2005. CSiR 
incidents data were drawn from articles in the Factiva database. Data for 
governance variables, such as director age, gender, and tenure, were obtained 
from RiskMetrics database. Firm level data, such as firm age, size, ROA 
(return on assets), and industry were obtained from COMPUSTAT. Corporate 
philanthropy data were obtained from the National Directory of Corporate 
Giving. This database is well established and has been used in several 
stuides( Marquis & Lee,2013; Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013). 
Procedures for Coding CSiR incidents 
Following Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen (2009)’s study, CSiR incident 
in this study is defined by the initiation of a lawsuit against the firm by a 
customer, third party, or competitor, or the announcement of regulatory action. 
I began our research by identifying Fortune 500 firms which experienced 
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negative legal or regulatory action against them. I collected information from 
articles published on Wall Street Journal, New York Times and Washington 
Post between 1996 and 2005. I focus on the three journals as media sources 
because of their role as opinion leaders, their national coverage and their 
importance to financial community (Navis & Glynn, 2010; Bednar, 2012). I 
searched the newspaper during the corresponding time period for company 
name and key words in the article’s text using Factiva database. Our start 
terms are “ scandal”, “violation”, “pollution” “ fraud”, “fine” ,“penalty” , 
“safety” , “illegality”,“ sui*” ,“lawsuit”, “crime” and “guilt" . I followed the 
search terms used in Mishnia (2010)’s study and made the terms more general 
to capture more information. Following Bednar (2012:138), I only focus on 
articles mentioning a sample firm in the title or lead paragraph to make sure 
that meaningful content relating to the firm was included. Using these criteria, 
I downloaded 1921 articles of the sampled firms from Factiva. For the 633 
firms appeared in Fortune 500 list during 1996 and 2005, I found CSiR related 
incidents for 203 firms.  
A potential concern with using keyword searching is that the keyword 
list might be too narrow. The final researching result may not cover all the 
corporate social irresponsible activities reported in the three newspapers. 
Nevertheless, the keyword selection would not introduce any systematic bias 
into the analysis. It could only reduce the power of our tests (since potentially 
relevant articles might be omitted).  
I manually coded the 1921 articles. The author first conducted a pilot 
study by coding randomly selected 100 articles (about 5% of total sample). 
Based on the pilot study, the author established a preliminary version of 
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codebook. Then, the author held a training seminar for six coders. After the 
training session, all the six coders were asked to code the same 50 articles 
independently first. Then, the author and six coders discussed the inconsistent 
coding results of the six coders to make sure all coders have consistent 
understanding of the coding scheme. 
The six coders were randomly assigned to three groups, two coders per 
group. The articles are randomly assigned to three groups. Within each group, 
the articles were coded independently. The two coders within the three groups 
agreed on 82%, 89%  and 79% of the codings, suggesting relatively high inter-
coder reliability. If the coding of a variable is inconsistent within group, the 
author would use the same coding scheme to code the variable independently 
and discuss with the two coders until a final agreement was made (See 
codebook in AppendixA). The distribution of articles from 1996 to 2005 is 
indicated in Figure1. Given the variation of this distribution, I controlled for 
year dummies in our analysis.  
 
 










The distribution of total number of articles by year







Our dependent variable is the amount of corporation philanthropy 
spent by firm in a given year. Since the distribution of the amount of corporate 
philanthropy is highly skewed, I logged the corporate philanthropy. Since this 
study focuses on corporate philanthropy after CSiR, the variable is led for one 
year. 
Independent variable 
This study used the number of CSiR incidents to indicate the level of 
CSiR incidents. It is measured by the number of lawsuits against the firm by 
stakeholders, such as shareholder, customer, employee, supplier, or third party, 
or regulatory actions against the firm. For lawsuit that last for one more year, I 
view it as an independent event in each year.  
 To examine the resource dependence relationship between firms and 
stakeholders involved in CSiR, this study further classified CSiR into different 
types. As I noted in previous section, CSiR refers to the set of actions that 
negatively affects identifiable social stakeholders’ legitimate claims ( in the 
longer run). CSiR incidents vary in their direct relationship with different 
stakeholders. For instance, product quality problem puts consumers’ health at 
risk and violate customer’s expectation that business should 
manufacture safe products (Carroll, 1979). Financial misrepresentation, 
another widely studied CSiR activity, hurts shareholder benefit by misusing 
facts, and misinterpreting accounting rules (Arthadu-Day, et.al.,2006). These 
two CSiR incidents have direct influence on different stakeholders, customer 
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and shareholder, respectively. Therefore, CSiR incidents could be classified 
into different categories based on the type of stakeholders who are directly 
influenced by the CSiR. This logic is consistent with the argument made by 
Clarkson (1995). He suggested that CSR performance can be analyzed and 
evaluated more effectively by using a framework based on the management of 
a firm’s relationships with its stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995). In this studies, 
CSiR could also be analyzed based on firm’s relationship with its stakeholders. 
In fact, the categories of KLD (Kinder, Lydenberg & Domini) social rating, 
most widely used CSiR data, also parallel to different types of stakeholders. 
They tend to evaluate firm’s problem or threat related to shareholders 
(corporate governance section), employee (employee relation section and 
diversity section), customer (product quality section), local community 
(community section and environment section), supplier, and social issues 
(Hillman, & Keim, 2001). 
Therefore, in this study, I would like to examine the stakeholders 
involved in CSiR incidents and classify CSiR based on the five types of 
stakeholders, who are the victim of CSiR incidents1. If CSiR hurts the benefit 
of a particular social stakeholder, e.g., shareholder, I would regard the 
negative event as the particular stakeholder related CSiR activity, e.g., 
shareholder-related CSiR. For instance, as sales of defective product breach 
the social contract between a firm and its customer and risk the benefit of 
customers, this type of negative event would be regarded as customer-related 
                                                            
1 While we noted that CSiR always impacts the benefits of various stakeholders, we only focus on 
stakeholder who have direct relationship with CSiR (Hillman & Keim, 2001). For instance, while product safety 
problem influences a long list of stakeholders, such as shareholders, customers, or employee, we only focus on 
customers, because it directly breaches the social contract between firms and customers that business should 
manufacture safe products (Carroll, 1979). For employees and shareholders, while product safety problem may 
negatively impact their interest, it does not directly violate their social contract with firms. Moreover, in response to 
the same type of negative events, stakeholders have similar claims. Murillo-Luna and her colleague(2008) found that 
in response to environment-related issue, firms tend to treat all related stakeholder’s demand to improve environment 
performance as a single dimension. Therefore, the direct victim could represent the claims of the rest stakeholders.  
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CSiR. Therefore, I classified CSiR into five types and measured the number of 
each type of CSiR in each year(Refers Table2 for the definition and examples 
of different CSiR types). The distribution of different types of CSiR from 






























violation relates to 
shareholder benefit, 






failure to monitor 
top managers. 
“Top managers stole $170 million from the 
company and reaped an additional $430 million 
through stock fraud”( Tyco international,  WSJ, 
2004/04/03) 
“manipulated earnings to meet analysts' 
expectations”( Gateway, WSJ, 2007/03/09) 
 
fraudulently cooked the books at the 
appliance company in the mid-1990s to create the 
illusion of a successful turnaround, inflate the share 
price and reap millions of dollars in stock 
profits( Sunbeam, Washington Post, 2001/05/16) 
 
failed to make timely adjustments to the value 
of its incinerators and other assets. (Waste 














Product safety, product quality 
Dow Corning yesterday took a tough new 
stand with women who believe they became ill from 
silicone breast implants, making a new settlement 
offer largely contingent on a single trial to determine 
whether implants make people sick.  
Product recall 
Ford widens recall of F-150 pickup for air 
bag defect to 1.2 million vehicles. ( Ford, 
Washington Post, 2011/4/15) 
Misleading information/advertisement to 
customers, overcharging, or cheating behaviors 
Johnson & Johnson has agreed to settle a 
lingering class-action lawsuit that claimed the 
company misled consumers by marketing two brands 
of essentially interchangeable contact lenses at 
significantly different prices.  




 Note: Financial firm’s customers could be 
shareholders or bond holder of other listed firms. For 
lawsuits against financial firms disseminating 
misleading information to investors, we treat them as 
customer-related cases. 
misleading investors about a $1 billion 
investment it sold in 2007 tied to the collapsing 
housing market(Citigroup, NYT, 2011/12/28) 
 Firms defrauding government, 
overcharging government when doing business 
with government  
accusing the company's Downey, Calif., 
machine shop of overcharging NASA for space 







violation relates to 
the benefit of 
employee. 
Examples are  age, 







Boeing Co. agreed yesterday to pay up to 
$72.5 million to settle a sex-discrimination lawsuit 
filed on behalf of 29,000 current and former female 
employees at its Seattle area facilities, where it 
primarily builds commercial aircraft.   ( Boeing, 
WSJ, 2005/12/22) 
Work place safety 
a deadly explosion at a natural-gas plant in 
that country in 1998  
Workplace harassment 
A county judge in Minnesota ordered a 
bottling unit of PepsiCo Inc. to pay $1.6 million to a 
former employee in a sexual harassment suit.(Pepsi, 
WSJ, 1994/05/17) 
Worker’s welfare, such as work over time 
and cut 
forcing employees to work during rest breaks 




the insurer deprived its agents of retirement 
and health-insurance benefits( New York Life 
Insurance, WSJ, 2001/03/01) 
other Illegal practice 
employ illegal immigrant employee(Tyson 





violation relates to 
the benefit of 
stakeholders in the 
value chain, such 
as suppliers 
contract breach with suppliers, expropriate 
the benefit of suppliers, and so on. 
  broken a licensing agreement to produce and 
sell underwear(Warnaco Group, NYT, 2001/05/24) 
  overcharging commercial truck 
dealerships(Ford Motor,NYT, 2011/06/11) 
Intellectual right related issues.  
   If the conflict is between firm and 
individual patent holder, we view individual patent 
holder as resource provider. 
















Bethlehem Steel Corp. settled a major air-
pollution case by agreeing to spend $32 million on 
antipollution equipment and pay $6.7 million in civil 
penalties to the federal government and the 
commonwealth of Pennsylvania.(Bethlehem Steel 








Shareholder-related CSiR incident refers to the lawsuit or regulation 
violation that hurts shareholder benefit, such as shareholder class lawsuit, 
accounting fraud, information disclosure issue, embezzling, or failure to 
monitor top managers. Number of shareholder-related CSiR incidents is 
measured by the no of shareholder-related CSiR incidents in a given year.  
Customer-related CSiR incident refers to the lawsuit or regulation 
violation that hurts the benefit of customers, such as product safety issue, 
misleading information/advertisement to customers. Number of customer-
related CSiR incidents is measured by no of customer-related CSiR incidents 
in a given year.  
Employee-related CSiR incident refers to the lawsuit or regulation 
violation that hurts the benefit of employee, such as age, gender, or race 
discrimination, work environment safety, workplace harassment, illegal layoff 
and other illegally employment practices. Number of employee-related CSiR 
incidents is measured by the no of employee-related CSiR incidents in a given 
year.  
Supplier-related CSiR incident refers to the lawsuit or regulation 
violation that hurts the benefit of stakeholders in the value chains, more 
specifically suppliers. The CSiR incidents include contract breach with 
suppliers, using its market power to expropriate the benefit of suppliers. 
Number of supplier-related CSiR incidents is measured by no of supplier-
related CSiR incidents in a given year. 
Community-related CSiR activity refers to cases when firms hurt local 
community’s benefit. The most typical case is environmental pollution. 
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Number of community-related CSiR incidents is measured by no. of 
community-related CSiR incidents in a given year.  
 
 
Figure 2 The distribution of different types of CSiR incidents from 
1996 to 2005 
 
I used the average organization tenure of top managers, such as CEO, 
CFO, and other top executives, to measure TMT tenure.  
Control variables: This study control for factors that previous research 
suggested influence firm’s responses to CSIR. To take into account board 
structure effect, I measured independent director ratio with the ratio of 
independent directors in the board. Moreover, it has been found that the 
demographic features of top management team impact firm’s likelihood to 
donate (Marquis & Lee, 2013). To consider top management team level 
influence, I controlled the average age of top managers and the percentage of 
female top managers. To account for the impact of institutional investors 
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percentage of institutional ownership and institutional ownership 
concentration with the Herfindahl index. This study also considered the effect 
of analyst coverage by controlling the no. of analysts who followed the firm. 
For firm level effect, I controlled firm age, size, and performance. I measured 
firm size by log of firm sales.  I controlled financial performance through 
ROA. In addition, since previous studies found that firms with more 
advertising and R&D are more likely to donate, I controlled firm’s 
advertisement and R&D expenses.  
 I controlled the amount of corporate philanthropy in the past three 
years to consider firm’s prior corporate philanthropy. Moreover, firms’ 
organizational structure, such as corporate foundation, would impact firm’s 
corporate philanthropy decision(Marquis& Lee, 2013). To consider the effect 
of formal organizational structure, I controlled whether firms have corporate 
foundation. It is coded as 1 if firms have corporation foundation; otherwise, 0.  
I considered the number of prior total CSiR incidents in the past three 
years to consider the effect of previous CSiR incidents.  
 Firms may make changes as a response to CSiR incidents. Firm’s 
response may impact the way firms respond to corporate philanthropy after 
CSiR incidents. One typical response after CSiR incidents is replacing 
executives. I controlled top manager turnover rate to consider the effect of 
firm’s response to CSiR incidents. 
I also controlled the number of reports on CSiR incident to control the 




This study employed a fixed-effect model to predict corporate 
philanthropy. A fixed-effects model is statistically equivalent to a change 
score model and removes all between-firm differences. It makes the fixed 
effects model particularly suitable for situations such as ours, where the main 
interest is the change of corporate philanthropy after the disclosure of CSiR 
incidents. 
I conducted a Hausman test to further check the appropriateness of 
using fixed effect model. Since the result of Hausman test rejects the null 
hypothesis that the results of random effect model and fixed effect model are 
same, it suggests that unobserved firm level heterogeneity is related to 
corporate philanthropy. The Hausman test also indicates the fixed effect model 
is an appropriate choice. 
I further conducted a Breusch-Pagan LM test to check the error 
structure of the data. The result strongly rejected homoskedasticity. Therefore, 
in the research model I used robust standard error to handle problems relating 








Table 3 Descripitive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
1.Corporate philanthropy(dummy) 2.92 5.81                       
2.No. of  CSiR incidents .14 .60 .09                      
3.No. of shareholder-related CSiR .03 .19 .02 .42                     
4.No. of customer-related CSiR .05 .36 .07 .74 .08                    
5.No. of employee-related CSiR .02 .15 .05 .43 .09 .13                   
6.No. of supplier-related CSiR .01 .08 .02 .23 .05 .05 .05                  
7.No. of community-related CSiR .01 .11 .04 .25 .01 .02 .08 .02                 
8.TMT tenure 5.83 2.80 .03 .02 -.01 .03 .01 .01 -.02                
9.TMT age 62.38 6.36 .04 -.05 -.07 -.01 -.01 -.03 .05 .05               
10.TMT gender .04 .09 .01 .02 .04 .00 .02 .00 -.02 .01 -.22              
11.Independent director ratio .67 .18 .13 .05 .05 .03 .02 .02 .00 -.14 -.21 .06             
12.ROA .04 .42 .00 .00 -.01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .02 .00 .00 -.01            
13.Firm age 28.56 16.69 .21 .06 -.02 .07 .04 .02 .05 .17 .11 .01 .28 .03           
14.Firm size (lnsale) 8.04 1.36 .26 .26 .10 .19 .15 .06 .07 .20 -.10 .04 .19 .06 .34          
15.Ownership concentration .07 .09 -.12 -.06 -.02 -.03 -.02 -.03 -.03 -.15 .01 .04 -.15 .00 -.13 -.32         
16.Analysts coverage 8.92 9.45 .18 .11 .04 .04 .07 .04 .04 .14 .02 .01 .10 .03 .16 .34 -.37        
17.R&D expenses(ln) 1.65 2.37 .15 .19 .05 .16 .04 .03 .04 .00 .04 -.06 .18 .01 .27 .25 -.15 .26       
18.Advertisement expenses(ln) 1.33 2.23 .13 .18 .06 .14 .07 .04 -.01 .06 -.12 .10 .05 .01 .15 .30 -.10 .19 .16      
19.Corporate foundation(dummy) .44 .50 .47 .12 .06 .09 .06 .03 .03 .07 .02 .02 .23 .02 .37 .38 -.17 .21 .22 .19     
20.Prior corporate philanthropy 3.01 3.69 .71 .14 .05 .12 .08 .03 .04 .05 .07 .02 .23 .01 .33 .41 -.19 .27 .24 .20 .70    
21.Prior CSiR incidents(dummy) .27 .63 .11 .42 .23 .29 .19 .07 .08 -.01 -.02 .02 .09 .00 .09 .31 -.06 .17 .18 .18 .16 .19   
22.Report no per CSiR incidents .13 .54 .07 .58 .41 .31 .30 .16 .20 .00 -.05 .02 .05 .00 .05 .21 -.05 .10 .13 .14 .11 .11 .34  




Table3 presents descriptive statistics and correlation matrix. Total 
number of CSiR incidents is significantly related to the number of 
shareholder-related incidents(r=.42,p<.001), the number of customer-related 
incidents(r=.74,p<.001) and the number of employee-related 
incidents(r=.43,p<.001). The results suggest that the incidents related to 
shareholders, customers, and employees are the three biggest components of 
CSiR incidents. In the later analysis, I put total of CSiR incidents and the 
number of different types of CSiR incidents in different models to avoid 
multicollinearity problem. Table3 provide preliminary support to H1, as the 
number of CSiR incidents is positively correlated to corporate 
philanthropy(r=.09,p<.001).  
Table4 presents the fixed effect model predicting corporate 
philanthropy. Model1 is the baseline hypothesis. In Model2, including the 
total number of CSiR incidents improves the overall model fit(d.f.=1,p<.01). 
In Model3, I added the number of different types of CSiR incidents. The 
overall model fit improves, compared to the baseline hypothesis(d.f.=5,p<.05).  
The addition of interaction term between top managers’ power over board and 
the number of CSiRs related to shareholders and customers also improves 
overall fit for Model 4(d.f.=7, p<.01). In Table5, I classified firms into 
subgroups based on top managers’ tenure, debt-ratio and market competition 
to predict corporate philanthropy.  
 H1 predicts that firms with more CSiR incidents are more likely to 
increase corporate philanthropy in next year. In Model 2 of Table3, the no of 
CSiR incidents at year t are positively related to the amount of corporate 
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philanthropy at year t+1(β=0.61; p<.01). The findings suggest that, keeping 
other variables constant, one more CSiR incident leads to a 84.04% (equals to 
e0.61 -1) increase in corporate philanthropy spending. The result supports 
Hypothesis1.  
To test H2, I included the number of different type of CSiR practices in 
Model3 of Table4. the number of shareholder-related CSiR events and the 
number of customer-related CSiR events are positively related to the amount 
of corporate philanthropy at next year(β=1.86,p<.05; β=.98, 
p<.05,respectively). The results suggest that, keeping other variables constant, 
one more shareholder-related CSiR incident leads to a 542%( equals to e1.86 -1) 
increases in corporate philanthropy spending, while one more customer-
related CSiR incidents leads to a 166.45%( equals to e0.98 -1) increase. 
However, the relationship between corporate philanthropy and the number of 
CSiR incidents related to local community, employee, and supplier are not 
significant. The results support H2.  
H3 predicts that firms with longer TMT tenure are more likely to use 
corporate philanthropy to compensate shareholder-related and customer-
related CSiR incidents. To test this hypothesis, I first added the interaction of 
TMT tenure with the number of shareholder-related CSiR and the interaction 
with number of customer-related CSiR. The model 4 in Table 3 show the 
interaction of TMT tenure with the number of shareholder-related CSiR is 
positively significant (β=0.48,p<.05). The result partially supports H3. To 
illustrate the moderating role of TMT tenure, I further classified firms into two 
groups: firms with TMT tenure higher than average and firms with TMT 
tenure lower than average. The findings in Model 5 and Model 6 of Table 4 
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suggest that in groups with long TMT tenure, the relationships between 
shareholder-related CSiR and corporate philanthropy is positively significant 
(p<.01), while the relationship is non-significant in firms with short TMT 
tenure(See Figure3). The findings in Model 5 and Model6 in Table5 are 























Table 4 Fixed effects models predicting the effect of CSiR on corporation 
philanthropy, Fortune 500 firms, 1996-2005 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4
  
CSiR no 0.61*  
 (0.307)  
Shareholder-related CSiR no 1.86** -1.40
 (0.717) (1.448)
Customer-related CSiR no 0.98** 0.91
 (0.336) (0.844)
Employee-related CSiR no 0.66 0.72
 (0.655) (0.650)
Supplier-related CSiR no -0.04 -0.03
 (1.386) (1.370)
Community-related CSiR no -0.49 -0.41
 (1.146) (1.133)
Shareholder CSiR no* TMT Tenure 0.48*
 (0.231)
Customer CSiR no* TMT Tenure 0.01
 (0.113)
TMT tenure -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.12
 (0.069) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070)
TMT age 0.11* 0.11* 0.11* 0.10*
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
TMT gender -2.91 -2.92 -3.00 -2.99
 (1.593) (1.591) (1.591) (1.588)
Independent director ratio 1.31 1.28 1.24 1.20
 (0.996) (0.993) (0.991) (0.991)
Firm age -0.21* -0.20* -0.20* -0.20*
 (0.082) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083)
Sales(ln) 1.18** 1.14** 1.15** 1.20**
 (0.378) (0.375) (0.371) (0.367)
roa -1.14 -1.09 -1.09 -1.07
 (1.428) (1.416) (1.423) (1.425)
ownership_concentration -4.02 -4.18 -4.54 -4.62
 (3.210) (3.208) (3.229) (3.226)
Analysts coverage 0.040 0.046 0.045 0.043
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
R&D(ln) -0.33 -0.36 -0.38 -0.38
 (0.395) (0.395) (0.390) (0.391)
Advertising(ln) 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03
 (0.107) (0.110) (0.108) (0.108)
Corporate foundation (dummy) 4.34*** 4.33*** 4.33*** 4.33***
 (0.671) (0.678) (0.670) (0.666)
Prior corporate philanthropy -1.18*** -1.18*** -1.18*** -1.19***
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
Prior CSiR incidents(dummy) -0.01 -0.06 -0.09 -0.09
 (0.255) (0.256) (0.265) (0.264)
Report no per CSiR incidents 0.06 -0.38 -0.50 -0.52
 (0.250) (0.325) (0.291) (0.281)
TMT turnover ratio 0.43 0.42 0.52 0.42
 (1.641) (1.639) (1.635) (1.622)
Constant -5.47 -5.04 -5.30 -4.98
 (5.165) (5.169) (5.148) (5.154)
R-squared 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.30
Likelihood-ratio test vs. Model1 8.72** 13.4*** 19.57***
Degree of freedom 1 5 7 
Note: number of observation=4314, number of firm= 597. Robust standard errors in 








Table 5 Fixed effect models predicting the effect of CSiR on corporate 
philanthropy by subgroups, Fortune 500 firms, 1996-2005 
 TMT tenure Debt ratio Market competition 
 High Low High Low High Low 
 Model5 Model6 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 
Shareholder-related CSiR 
no 
2.95* 1.09 2.05* 1.35 2.48* 1.10 
 (1.184) (0.751) (0.798) (1.337) (1.024) (0.951) 
Customer-related CSiR no 0.99 1.26* 1.00** 1.28 0.85 1.09* 
 (0.506) (0.492) (0.363) (1.022) (0.463) (0.458) 
Employee-related CSiR no 1.27 -0.22 0.43 2.11 0.51 0.87 
 (0.785) (0.951) (0.781) (1.855) (0.855) (0.882) 
Supplier-related CSiR no 0.97 -0.42 0.22 -1.20 -1.77 1.05 
 (1.664) (1.679) (1.437) (1.897) (0.925) (1.810) 
Community-related CSiR 
no 
-0.99 1.28 -1.00 3.49 2.91 -
4.33*** 
 (1.664) (1.566) (1.087) (3.390) (1.686) (1.146) 
TMT tenure -0.22* -0.28 -0.10 -0.15 -0.24 -0.05 
 (0.108) (0.203) (0.076) (0.173) (0.130) (0.083) 
TMT age 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.18* 0.07 
 (0.080) (0.072) (0.050) (0.137) (0.080) (0.060) 
TMT gender -1.32 -3.77 -2.03 -8.56 -3.88 -2.45 
 (2.428) (2.281) (1.586) (5.960) (2.644) (1.959) 
Independent director ratio -1.01 3.89** 0.50 4.14 1.64 1.16 
 (1.485) (1.461) (1.090) (2.473) (1.589) (1.269) 
roa 0.11 -0.98 -1.08 0.73 1.77 -2.69 
 (2.761) (2.185) (1.468) (4.800) (1.805) (1.817) 
Firm age -0.06 -0.24 -0.17 -0.40 -0.26 -0.13 
 (0.139) (0.131) (0.089) (0.217) (0.156) (0.096) 
Sales(ln) 1.11 1.65* 0.88* 3.50* 1.73** 0.71 
 (0.650) (0.696) (0.370) (1.554) (0.526) (0.530) 
ownership_concentration -17.66* -1.67 -4.01 -2.32 -5.04 -5.13 
 (7.128) (4.810) (3.805) (7.562) (5.005) (4.369) 
Analysts coverage 0.08 0.01 0.05 -0.03 0.08 0.03 
 (0.052) (0.045) (0.033) (0.092) (0.059) (0.038) 
R&D(ln) -0.57 -0.77 0.03 -1.02 -0.60 -0.34 
 (0.524) (0.735) (0.489) (0.590) (1.006) (0.388) 
Advertising(ln) -0.15 0.33 0.07 -0.07 -0.03 0.06 
 (0.142) (0.223) (0.118) (0.229) (0.177) (0.134) 
Corporate foundation 
(dummy) 
4.24*** 3.76*** 4.44*** 3.89** 4.62*** 3.98*** 













 (0.086) (0.101) (0.073) (0.159) (0.102) (0.086) 
Prior CSiR 
incidents(dummy)
0.06 -0.28 -0.27 0.64 -0.10 -0.01 
 (0.402) (0.394) (0.288) (0.633) (0.345) (0.399) 
Report no per CSiR 
incidents 
-0.31 -1.08* -0.65* -0.10 -0.76 -0.34 
 (0.353) (0.417) (0.304) (1.129) (0.416) (0.386) 
TMT turnover ratio 0.54 1.08 0.62 0.58 -1.05 1.31 
 (2.391) (2.450) (1.764) (3.873) (2.192) (2.183) 
Constant -3.75 -7.75 -4.26 -13.17 -10.56 -3.27 
 (8.643) (8.816) (5.418) (16.311) (9.146) (6.262) 
    
R-squared 0.31 0.28 0.29 0.23 0.32 0.21 
Observations 2474 1804 1746 2568 1,723 2,550 
Number of firmid 323 244 264 333 259 331 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, two-tailed tests.    




Figure 3 Relationship between the numbers of shareholder-related CSiR 






I conducted future tests to ensure that sample composition and 
alternative measures did not bias our result. First, I examine whether our 
unbalanced panel could introduce sample bias. I estimated the same model 
over the subsample of long-staying groups: those that existed in all 10 time 
points and those exist in at least 7 time points. The findings are consistent with 
those reported above. Second, I used alternative measurements to check the 
robustness of the results in this study. To account for the effect of industry 
norms on corporate philanthropy, I used corporate philanthropy minus 
industry average corporate philanthropy as an alternative measurement.  The 
findings still hold. Moreover, I divided corporate philanthropy by firm sales to 















measurement, the findings remain unchanged. Besides several tests on 
dependent variables, I also checked the robustness of independent variable, the 
CSiR incidents. In this study, the effect of CSiR incidents is captured by the 
number of CSiR incidents, without accounting for the magnitude of each 
incident. To resolve this problem, I  weighted each CSiR incidents by number 
of reports on each CSiR incidents. Using the weighted measure of CSiR 
incidents, the findings still hold.  
One possible explanation to the divergent response to different type of 
CSiR is that different stakeholders have their preferences. Shareholders and 
customers may prefer corporate philanthropy compared to other stakeholders. 
Therefore, it would be the preference of different stakeholders, instead of the 
interdependency between stakeholders and firms, that determine firm’s 
likelihood to increase corporate philanthropy after CSiR. To consider this 
alternative explanation, I tried to test firm’s tendency to increase corporate 
philanthropy after CSiR in two settings. First, I classified firms into two 
groups, firms with higher debt ratio higher than average and firms with debt 
ratio lower than average.  The two groups of firms vary in their financial risk. 
If the stakeholder preference explanation holds, shareholders would have 
similar preference to corporate philanthropy. As a result, there would be no 
difference between the two groups, even though firms in different groups have 
different level of resource interdependency relationship with stakeholders. 
However, the results in Model 7 and Model 8 in Table 5 suggest that firms 
with higher financial risk are more likely to increase corporate philanthropy 
compared to firms with lower financial risk. Since firms with higher financial 
risk have higher dependence on shareholder, the result supports the resource 
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interdependency argument. I further classified firms into two types based on 
the industrial competitiveness and examine firm’s likelihood to increase 
corporate philanthropy after customer-related CSiR. The industry is viewed as 
high-competition industry, if the proportion of the largest 10 firms in the 
industry is higher than the mean of all industries. The results in Model9 and 
Model10 in Table5 indicate that for firms operate in high competitive 
industries, they are more likely to increase corporate philanthropy after CSiR. 
This finding also supports the resource interdependence argument. Firms tend 
to have higher dependence on customers when they operate in industrials with 
higher competition, compared to firms in low competition industries.  
Previous studies in symbolic management also suggest that symbolic 
practice could substitute more substantial changes (Westphal & Zajac, 1998). 
To examine whether corporate philanthropy could substitute more substantial 
practices associated with legitimacy repair, I examine the impact of corporate 
philanthropy on TMT turnover ratio after CSiR. I found a significant negative 
relationship between corporate philanthropy and TMT turnover ratio (p<.05). 
This finding suggests that corporate philanthropy helps relieve pressures that 
firms face from stakeholders to repair legitimacy by deflecting attention from 
less desirable practice to more favourable practices. As a result, firms are 
under lower pressure to replace executives to dissociate the negative influence 
from firms.  
Another concern is whether corporate philanthropy could be a part of 
real changes within organization. To test this alternative explanation, I 
examined whether the firms who increase corporate philanthropy after CSiR 
would be discovered to engage in CSiR behaviors in a 16 year observation 
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window from 1996 to 2011. I found that for the 195 firms, who increase 
corporate philanthropy after CSiR incidents,151 of them engaged in CSiR 
again. The result suggests that for firms who increase corporate philanthropy 
after CSiR, most of them failed to prevent the CSiR from happening again.   
DISCUSSION 
The findings provide support for the theoretical arguments in this study. 
I argue that corporate philanthropy after CSiR incidents serves as an 
impression management tactic to reconcile the conflicting demands of 
stakeholders and internal managers. On the one hand, corporate philanthropy 
could deflect external stakeholders’ attention from social irresponsible 
incidents. On the other hand, corporate philanthropy is less likely to change 
the internal operation and power dynamic within firms. Firm’s tendency to 
increase corporate philanthropy depends on the power of stakeholders and 
internal managers. Based on Fortune 500 data from 1996 to 2005, I found that 
firms tend to increase corporate philanthropy after CSiR incidents. Firms are 
more likely to increase corporate philanthropy when firms have higher 
dependence on stakeholders involved in the CSiR incidents. More specifically, 
firms are more likely to increase corporate philanthropy after shareholder-
related CSiR incidents and customer-related CSiR incidents. However, firms 
are unlikely to increase corporate philanthropy in response to employee related, 
supplier-related and community-related CSiR incidents. Moreover, firms are 
more likely to increase corporate philanthropy in respond to shareholder-
related CSiR incidents when top managers have longer organizational tenure.  
The results in this study fail to support the hypothesis that firms are 
more likely to increase corporate philanthropy in respond to customer-related 
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CSiR incidents when top managers have longer tenure. One of possible 
reasons is that this study used a relatively simple measure, a four cells 
categorization, to examine resource dependency between firms and 
stakeholders. This method tends to ignore the variance of resource dependency 
relationship between firms and customers across firms, so the moderating role 
of top manager tenure on customer-related CSiR incidents would be 
underestimated.  
This study extends our understanding on legitimacy repair. Previous 
studies on legitimacy repair always focus on how firm uses restructuring or 
executive dismissal to meet the requirement of stakeholders (Suchman, 1995; 
Arthaud-Day, Certo, Dalton, & Dalton, 2006). They overlook the resistance 
from internal managers and how the resistance impact firm’s strategy to repair 
legitimacy. I argued that corporate philanthropy after CSiR could serve as an 
impression management tactic to reconcile the demands from both 
stakeholders and internal managers during legitimacy repair. By doing so, this 
study extends our understanding of legitimacy repair strategy by considering 
both the external pressure and internal resistance.  
Second, this study contributes to the line of studies that attempt to 
establish the linkage between CSR and CSI. Although a few studies noticed 
that firms may increase CSR after CSI to repair illegitimacy of CSI, we are 
unclear about which factors lead firms to select the specific strategy. This 
study addressed this question by borrowing the insight of impression 
management. This study proposed a framework that corporate philanthropy 
serves to reconcile the conflicting demands of external stakeholders and the 
resistance of internal managers. I find that firms are most likely to increase 
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corporate philanthropy after CSiR incidents when firms have high dependence 
on the stakeholders whose legitimate claims are violated by the CSiR incidents 
and when top managers have stronger resistance to change.  
Third, this study adds to a small but growing literature on CSI by 
developing a framework to understand how firms respond to CSI. Instead of 
aggregating different dimensions of CSI in a single construct, I unpacked CSI 
into five types based on stakeholder theory and demonstrate how firm’s 
response varies across different types of CSI. By unpacking CSI into different 
types, I find that firms strategically respond to different types of CSiR 
incidents. They tend to use different respond methods in response to different 
CSiR incidents. This finding also indicates that the results or conclusions get 
from one case or type of CSiR incidents may not be applied to other type of 
CSiR incidents. For instance, the finding based on the sample of shareholder, 
such as firm are more likely to increase donation after shareholder-related 
CSiR incidents, may not be applied to that of employees. This study thus 
echoed the calling for paying attention to the specific components of CSR 
(Strike et al.,2006) and extended it to CSI literature.  
Fourth, this study also enriches corporate philanthropy literature by 
discussing the features of corporate philanthropy. Although previous scholars 
noticed that corporate philanthropy is always external oriented and limited 
effect on firm’s internal operation, we are unclear about the implication of this 
characteristic. In this study, I proposed that as corporate philanthropy could 
show conformity external stakeholders without making substantial internal 
changes, it is employed by firms as an impression management tactic to 
balance the demands of external stakeholders and internal managers.  
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This study also has implications for non-profit organization and social 
movement activist. Our findings suggest that firms are more likely to deny 
employee and supplier-related CSiR incidents. The results indicate that large 
firms may misappropriate the benefit of employee and supplier. Therefore, 
social activism should pay attention to the employee and supplier-related CSiR 
incidents and involved in the interaction between the disadvantaged parties 
and firms. Previous studies found that the involvement of social activism 
could force firms to respond to employee-related CSiR practices (James & 
Wooden, 2005).  
This study is not without limit. First, this study uses a relatively simple 
measure, a four cells categorization, to examine resource dependency between 
firms and different stakeholders. This method tends to ignore the variance of 
resource dependency relationship between firms and different stakeholders 
across firms. While firms may have low dependence on suppliers and 
employees in our study, they may have high dependence on them when firms 
have high asset or human asset specificity relationship with suppliers or 
employees. Second, this study only focuses on newspapers report in three 
major national newspapers, ignoring the articles published on the local 
newspapers. This may cause bias to our results. Third, the sample in this study 
is the large Fortune 500 firms, which may impact the generalizability of this 
study. The findings in this article may not be applied to small companies. 
Another problem in this study is that I didn’t measure whether firms engage in 
internal changes after CSiR incidents. Although we controlled TMT turnover 
rate and did find that most firms are more likely to engage in CSiR incidents 
again after CSiR incidents, it would have been better if this study could have 
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examined other proxy of internal changes, such as adopting a new technology 
and reforming internal operation. Future studies could examine whether firms 
change their internal operations and explore the interaction between different 




Essay Two: Amplifying or Dampening? Corporate Philanthropy and Its 
Effect on the Negative Impact of CSiR Incidents 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate philanthropy is increasingly used as a strategy to offset the 
illegitimacy of CSI behavior. Firms may increase corporate philanthropy, a 
typical CSR action, when they experience negative events such as a customer 
boycott or disclosure of socially irresponsible practices (McDonnell & King, 
2013; Rao, Yue, & Ingram, 2011; Muller & Kräussl, 2011). This line of 
studies views corporate philanthropy as a strategy to offset the illegitimacy or 
value loss caused by corporate CSiR incidents. Muller & Kräussl (2011) found 
that companies with a poor social reputation were more likely to make a 
disaster relief donation after Hurricane Katrina than companies with a positive 
social reputation. McDonnell and King (2013) note that companies are more 
likely to disclose their prosocial behaviors when they are faced with a boycott 
organized by consumers or social groups.  
Surprisingly, few studies have examined whether corporate 
philanthropy can offset the negative influence of CSiR incidents. The few 
studies that explicitly discuss corporate philanthropy after CSiR incidents 
propose two opposing arguments for the effect of ex post corporate 
philanthropy. The first contends that corporate philanthropy after a CSiR 
incident can offset the negative impact of the incident (Seeger & Ulmer, 2001; 
Pfaffer, Decelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008). Other studies suggest that corporate 
philanthropy after CSiR incidents backfires. These inconclusive results have 
52 
 
spawned a debate: Does corporate philanthropy dampen or amplify the 
negative effect of CSiR incidents on a firm’s financial performance?  
The two sides of the debate focus on different interpretations of 
corporate philanthropy after CSiR incidents. One side holds that corporate 
philanthropy serves as a signal of a firm’s determination to purge negative 
influences and focus on renewal after a CSiR incident (Seeger & Ulmer, 2001; 
Pfaffer, Decelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008). The other side perceives concealed 
motives behind corporate philanthropy and views demonstrations of corporate 
philanthropy after CSiR incidents as superficial or hypocritical (Zavyalova et 
al., 2012). 
I propose to reconcile these different assessments of corporate 
philanthropy after CSiR incidents by developing a framework for how 
institutional logics determine stakeholders’ interpretation of corporate 
philanthropy after CSiR incidents. This framework uses an institutional theory 
perspective to contribute to CSR and CSI literature. The institutional theory 
perspective highlights the importance of high-level institutions in shaping the 
cognition and guiding the decision-making of actors. In this study, I highlight 
how the high-level institutional logics constrain actors’ interpretation of 
corporate philanthropy after CSiR incidents. More specifically, I focus on two 
types of institutional logics: the shareholder logic and the stakeholder logic. 
The two institutional logics make different assumptions and hold different 
beliefs about the purpose and nature of the firm. As a result, actors embedded 
in the two institutional logics diverge on interpretations of corporate 
philanthropy after CSiR incidents, which would further affect whether 
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corporate philanthropy dampens or amplifies the negative effects of CSiR 
incidents. 
Specifically, to capture the two institutional logics stakeholders are 
embedded in, I focus on two groups of stakeholders: stakeholders in the 
financial community—such as shareholders, potential investors, and security 
analysts—and stakeholders outside the financial community—such as green 
customer, environmental activists and local community. While the perceptions 
of stakeholders in the financial community are dominated by shareholder logic 
(Zajac & Westphal, 2004; Davis & Thompson, 1994), stakeholders outside the 
financial community are generally embedded in stakeholder logic (Lamin & 
Zaheer, 2012). As a result, the two types of stakeholders have different 
perceptions and interpretations of the nature of the firm, the objective of the 
firm, and the criteria for measuring legitimacy. However, this divergence has 
been ignored in previous stakeholder-theory studies, which tend to highlight 
the resource-dependence relationship between firms and stakeholders and to 
classify stakeholders as primary or secondary, based on the differences in their 
dependence relationships with firms (Clarkson, 1995; Hillman & Keim, 2001; 
Jackson & Greening, 1999). Without considering the higher level of 
institutional logics different kinds of stakeholders are embedded in, the 
literature fails to capture the different cognition or interpretations of various 
stakeholders and to explain why disparate stakeholders have diverging 
interpretations of the same response strategy after CSiR incidents.  
I further focus on two different types of CSiR incidents, shareholder-
related incidents and environment-related CSiR incidents, and test whether 
corporate philanthropy dampens or amplifies the negative effect of two 
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specific CSiR incidents on firm performance. This distinction between 
different types of CSiR incidents has rarely been made in the CSI literature. 
Similar to CSR studies, CSI studies have tended to either focus on a specific 
type of CSiR incident or to aggregate different types of CSiR incidents into 
the same category. Focusing on a specific type of CSiR incident constrains the 
generalizability of the findings across different types of CSiR incidents, and 
aggregating different types or dimensions of CSiR incidents into the same 
category ignores the variance among different components or dimensions 
within CSR or CSI. Using Fortune 500 data from 1991 to 2006, I propose and 
find that corporate philanthropy amplifies the negative effect of shareholder-
related CSiR incidents on firm performance and dampens the negative effect 
of environment-related CSiR incidents on firm performance.  
This study makes a number of contributions. First, I develop a 
framework to unpack the effect of corporate philanthropy after CSiR incidents. 
By considering the higher-level institutional logics stakeholders are embedded 
in, the study helps to reconcile different assessments of corporate philanthropy 
after CSiR incidents. I also suggest that the effect of corporate philanthropy 
depends on the higher-level institutional logics that actors are embedded in. 
Second, the study enriches stakeholder theory by highlighting the institutional 
logics stakeholders are embedded in. Instead of focusing on the resource-
dependence relationship of different stakeholders and firms, I highlight the 
institutional logics stakeholders are embedded in to capture the variance in 
their cognition and interpretations of the same practice. Third, the study 
contributes to CSI literature by disaggregating CSiR incidents into different 
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types, echoing the call for more studies on disaggregating CSR or CSiR 
incidents (Hillman & Keim, 2001; Godfrey et al., 2009).  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS 
Corporate socially irresponsible behavior violates stakeholders’ 
expectations of conformity to social norms, which places the firm’s legitimacy 
at risk (Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Shapiro, 2012). Firms experiencing CSiR 
incidents are more likely to suffer from diminished stakeholder support and 
limited access to resources. Empirical evidence also shows that CSiR 
behaviors lead to financial losses (see Margolis & Walsh, 2003, for a review), 
stock-price deterioration (Palmrose, Richardson, & Scholz, 2004), employee 
turnover (Authaud-Day, Certo, Dalton, & Dalton, 2006), or customer boycott 
(McDonnell & King, 2013). For instance, Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz 
(2004) found that the firms’ stock prices dropped an average of 9% in the two 
days following a financial restatement, which is a shareholder-related CSiR 
incident. An emerging stream of studies has found that firms increase publicity 
about their corporate philanthropy when they experience negative events such 
as boycotts, protests, or disclosure of socially irresponsible practices (Morris 
& King, 2012; Rao et al., 2010).  
Although recent studies have noted that an increasing number of firms 
use corporate philanthropy or other socially responsible means as a response 
to CSiR incidents, the performance consequences of this behavior are unclear. 
A few studies explicitly discuss whether corporate philanthropy can offset the 
negative effects of CSiR incidents on firm performance or media tenor. For 
instance, Williams and Barrett (2000) found that corporate philanthropy can 
partially offset the negative effects of violating regulations of the 
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Environmental Protection Agency or Occupational Safety and Health Agency. 
However, other studies suggest that this may backfire. Zavylova and 
colleagues (2012) found that ceremonial actions, such as corporate 
philanthropy, after a product recall strengthen the negative effects of 
wrongdoing on media tenor. This is because corporate philanthropy is 
inconsistent with the customer’s expectations after the firm’s product recall. 
The media and customers tend to perceive corporate philanthropy with distrust 
and suspicion. These studies reach conflicting conclusions about the effect of 
ex post corporate philanthropy.  
The literature has identified two competing interpretations of corporate 
philanthropy after CSiR incidents. The first argues that corporate philanthropy 
after a CSiR incident can serve as a signal of a firm’s determination to purge 
negative influences and focus its energy on renewal (Seeger & Ulmer, 2001; 
Pfaffer, Decelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008). Signaling their determination to 
external stakeholders is an important component of firm rehabilitation after 
crisis or wrongdoing, and help firms recover (Coombs, 2007; Mishina et al., 
2012; Pfarrer et al., 2008). Since corporate philanthropy conforms to the social 
expectations of stakeholders and helps firms to establish a positive relationship 
with stakeholders (Hillman & Keim, 2001; Jones, 1995; Wang & Choi, 2008), 
increasing corporate philanthropy after CSiR incidents can communicate to 
outside stakeholders a firm’s efforts to rebuild and their intention to meet 
external social expectations (Seeger & Ulmer, 2001; Pfaffer, Decelles, Smith, 
& Taylor, 2008). This belief would mitigate stakeholders’ concerns about a 
recurrence of CSiR incidents, thereby partially offsetting or attenuating the 
illegitimacy caused by CSiR. 
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Another line of argument views corporate philanthropy after CSiR 
incidents negatively. Allocating resources to corporate philanthropy is 
inconsistent with some stakeholders’ expectations of a firm’s actions after 
CSiR incidents (Zavylova et al., 2012). After CSiR incidents, stakeholders 
expect firms to take action to prevent them from recurring (Pfaffer et al., 
2008). Corporate philanthropy is associated with high direct costs without any 
substantial impact on a firm’s internal operations (Brammer, Pavelin, & Porter, 
2009; Brammer & Millington, 2008); resources invested in corporate 
philanthropy could be used for other activities to prevent CSiR incidents from 
reccurring. In this interpretation, stakeholders may suspect concealed motives 
behind corporate philanthropy. They may view corporate philanthropy after 
CSiR incidents as simply a ceremonial action to alter stakeholders’ 
perceptions of the firm by emphasizing its positive, alternative attributes 
(Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990) and deflecting stakeholders’ attention away from 
the wrongdoing (Zavylova et al., 2012).They may interpret corporate 
philanthropy after CSiR incidents as ceremonial or hypocritical and punish 
firms that allocate resources to ceremonial behavior. For instance, Zavylova 
and colleagues (2012) view corporate philanthropy as ceremonial action. They 
found that when a firm engages in ceremonial actions after a product recall, 
the tenor of mass media’s treatment of the firm becomes more negative. As a 
result, corporate philanthropy can backfire and amplify the negative effect of 
CSiR incidents on firm performance.  
How stakeholders interpret the motivation for corporate philanthropy 
may influence legitimacy repair after CSiR. In the first line of literature, 
corporate philanthropy is interpreted as a signal of the firm’s determination to 
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change. This belief would mitigate stakeholders’ concern for any reccurrence 
of CSiR incidents, thereby partially offsetting the illegitimacy caused by CSiR. 
However, if corporate philanthropy is viewed as an agency cost or ceremonial 
action to avoid substantial changes, it would not resolve the causes that led to 
the CSiR incident or be likely to prevent future CSiR incidents. As a result, 
corporate philanthropy may backfire and amplify the negative effect of CSiR.  
In this study, instead of arguing which interpretation is true, I will 
integrate and extend the two. Drawing on institutional theory, I argue that how 
stakeholders interpret corporate philanthropy after CSiR incidents depends on 
the institutional logics they are embedded in (Friedland & Alford, 1991). Their 
interpretation, in turn, determines the effect of corporate philanthropy.  
Institutional logics are the norms, values, and beliefs that structure the 
cognition of actors and guide decision making in a field (Thornton & Ocasio, 
1997).  Institutional logics constitute a set of assumptions and values about 
how to interpret organizational reality, what constitutes appropriate behavior, 
and how to succeed (March & Olsen, 1989; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). They 
also shape how actors interpret the meaning and the consequences of a specific 
behavior or practice. 
The interpretation of the same practice may change as the institutional 
logic shifts. Zajac and Westphal (2004) find that the stock market responded 
negatively to a stock-repurchase plan when the institutional logic was 
corporate logic, but the response changed to positive when the institutional 
logic shifted toward agency logic in the early 1980s. Ioannou and Serafeim 
(2014) show that, when the financial community was dominated by agency 
logic in the 1990s, sell-side analysts perceived CSR as an agency cost and 
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therefore issued pessimistic recommendations, such as  “sell,” for firms with 
high CSR ratings. The emergence of stakeholder logic has shifted analysts’ 
perceptions of CSR: Since the early 2000s, analysts have been more likely to 
recommend investors to “strongly buy” or “buy” the stock of firms with high 
CSR ratings.  
Actors embedded in different institutional logics diverge in their 
interpretation of the same practice. Recent developments in institutional logics 
have demonstrated how the presence of competing or multiple institutional 
logics leads to the divergence of a firm’s behaviors and responses in a field. 
For instance, Chung and Luo (2008) found that investors embedded in 
shareholder-oriented logic and those embedded in stakeholder-oriented logic 
tend to have different interpretations of the restructuring strategy in Taiwan. 
While firms embedded in shareholder-oriented logic value divestment to 
increase profits, investors embedded in stakeholder-oriented logic are more 
likely to value long-term relationships and less likely to divest. Lounsbury 
(2007) also notes that the two institutional logics in the mutual funds 
industry—trustees logic and performance logic—lead to variations in how 
mutual funds establish contracts with independent money-management firms. 
In the section below, I focus on two logics of the corporation, 
shareholder logic and stakeholder logic. The two institutional logics entail 
different beliefs and assumptions about the corporation, thus shaping 
normative beliefs about a wide range of corporate practices. Table 6 
summarizes key elements of shareholder logic and stakeholder logic. I argue 
that stakeholders embedded in differing institutional logics have different 
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interpretations of corporate philanthropy after CSiR incidents, and therefore 
impact the effect of corporate philanthropy after CSiR incidents. 
 
Table 6 Ideal types of institutional logics in the field of business 
 Shareholder logic Stakeholder logic 
The nature of firms A nexus of contractual 
arragements between 
individuals; legal fiction 
Social entity 





Transaction cost theory 
Stakeholder theory 
Source of legitimacy Whether firms maximize 
shareholder interest 
Whether firms are good 
citizen 




Basis of attention Efficiency; profitability. Social responsible; 
distribution of resource; 
care for all stakeholders. 
Logic of investment Future return and growth Whether firms are social 
responsible 
Implication for CSR Agency cost Build in purpose of firm 
 
The shareholder logic and the stakeholder logic 
The corporation is an entity whose defining characteristic is the 
attainment of a specific goal or purpose. However, scholars have argued over a 
firm’s purpose for more than a century and are far from finished. The 
shareholder logic and the stakeholder logic have different beliefs and make 
different assumptions about the purpose of the firm. Shareholder logic 
believes that the firm is organized and carries on primarily for the profit of 
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shareholders. Therefore, the purpose of the firm is to maximize shareholder 
benefit. Stakeholder logic argues that, as an entity, the corporation has 
citizenship responsibility on behalf of all stakeholders, not just shareholders 
(Freeman, 1980). The economic and social purposes of the firm are to create 
and distribute wealth and value to all its primary stakeholder groups, without 
favoring one group at the expense of others (Clarkson, 1995). 
The two institutional logics make different assumptions about the 
nature of the firm. The shareholder logic views the firm as a nexus of 
economic contracts (Coase, 1937; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Because 
shareholders are the residual claimants of a firm, maximizing shareholder 
value automatically maximizes payoffs to other stakeholders. The stakeholder 
logic believes that the firm can be understood as a set of relationships among 
diverse stakeholders that jointly create and trade value. For any business to be 
successful, it has to create value for customers, suppliers, employees, and 
communities, as well as for financiers, shareholders, banks, and other people 
with money (Freeman, 1984).  
The different assumptions about the purpose and the nature of the firm 
lead to divergent interpretations of what are appropriate behaviors for the firm. 
The shareholder logic emphasizes the firm’s capabilities or performance. The 
source of legitimacy is efficiency and profitability. Shareholder logic evaluates 
the appropriateness of a firm’s behavior based on whether the firm has 
maximized profit or efficiency. As a result, the actors embedded in 
shareholder logic focus on how the actions of a firm might contribute to 
increasing or decreasing the firm’s performance (Benner & Ranganathan, 
2009; Lamin & Zaheer, 2012).  
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The stakeholder logic is more concerned with the firm’s character and, 
more specifically, whether it is socially responsible and creates value for all 
stakeholders, instead of solely focusing on shareholders (Clarkson, 1995). The 
actors embedded in stakeholder logic tend to evaluate a firm’s actions in terms 
of boarder societal impact, rather than the impact on profit alone (Lamin & 
Zaheer, 2012). They care more about whether the firm is a good corporate 
citizen and behaves in a way that conforms to societal expectations. They also 
take into account the effect on a broader set of stakeholders beyond 
shareholders when evaluating whether the firm’s action is desirable, proper, or 
appropriate (Lamin & Zaheer, 2012; Suchman, 1995). 
The two institutional logics have coexisted in business as long as the 
modern corporate form has been in existence. In response to problems related 
to the separation of management and control in the modern corporation, two 
corporate law scholars, Berle and Mean, argued in their 1931 book, The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property, that managers should be trustees 
for asset owners—more specifically, for shareholders. In reply to Berle and 
Mean’s argument, Dobb (1932) stated that the corporation has, in addition, a 
vital social-service function. This debate demonstrates the coexistence of 
shareholder logic and stakeholder logic in the early 1930s. However, for most 
of the 20th century, shareholder logic has dominated the field.  Especially after 
the 1970s, the emergence of agency theory has made monitoring managers and 
protecting shareholder benefits a dominant issue for modern corporations 
(Zajac & Westphal, 2005; Westphal & Zajac, 1995). Stakeholder logic 
coexists uneasily with shareholder logic, and has been increasingly prominent 
since the seminal work of Freeman (1984).   
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This coexistence of shareholder logic and stakeholder logic can lead to 
variance in the actors’ interpretation of the same practice, which would be 
viewed as appropriate or legitimate for actors embedded in shareholder logic 
but violate the norms or beliefs of stakeholder logic. For instance, actors 
embedded in shareholder logic tend to have a positive opinion of labor transfer 
from the local country to countries with low labor costs (Lamin & Zaheer, 
2012), because the practice reduces the firm’s production costs and improves 
performance. However, the media and the general public, who are embedded 
in stakeholder logic, have a negative opinion of this practice, because leads to 
higher unemployment rates in the local community and hurts the interests of 
employees, who are important stakeholders.  
This coexistence of shareholder logic and stakeholder logic also gives 
rise to divergent interpretations of corporate social responsibility. For 
shareholder logic, any benefits to stakeholders from CSR come at the direct 
expense of firm value. Friedman (1970) argued that the fundamental 
obligation of a firm is to return profits to shareholders—not to invest corporate 
funds in endeavors that are socially beneficial but reduce shareholder returns. 
In Friedman’s view, the sole social responsibility of a corporation is to 
maximize profit. For stakeholder logic, CSR is built into the purpose of 
corporate activities (Freeman, 1984). It helps firms gain support from 
stakeholders and is vital for the firm’s survival (Clarkson, 1995). 
Institutional logics and CSiR incidents  
To capture the two institutional logics, as well as the effects of 
corporate philanthropy after CSiR incidents, I focus on two specific types of 
CSiR incidents, shareholder-related CSiR incidents and environment-related 
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CSiR incidents, and examine the effect of corporate philanthropy after these 
two types of CSiR incidents. A shareholder-related CSiR incident damages a 
legitimate claim of shareholders and negatively affects their benefits, such as a 
lawsuit or regulatory violation that involves accounting fraud, information-
disclosure issues, embezzlement, or failure to monitor top managers. A typical 
example of a shareholder-related CSiR incident is “to manipulate earnings to 
meet analysts’ expectations” (Gateway, Wall Street Journal, 2007/03/09). 
Environment-related CSiR incidents violate the green stakeholders and local 
community’s legitimate claim to a good environment. These include water and 
soil contamination, air pollution, oil spills, and other behaviors that 
contaminate the natural environment. Violations of the Clear Air Act are a 
common type of environment-related CSiR incidents. 
I chose these two specific types of CSiR incidents because the 
audiences for shareholder-related and environment-related CSiR incidents are 
embedded in shareholder logic and stakeholder logic, respectively. The 
audiences for shareholder-related incidents—such as shareholders, security 
analysts, and potential investors—are mostly embedded in shareholder logics. 
The sociological literature provides ample evidence that shareholder logic 
dominates the financial community (Zajac & Westphal, 2004; Westphal & 
Graebner, 2010). Research by Useem (1993), Westphal and Zajac (2004), 
Westphal and Graebner (2010), and Ioannou and Serafeim (2014) finds that 
investors increasingly assess corporate policies or behaviors according to 
whether they appear to have reduced agency costs and maximized shareholder 
benefit. Moreover, their assessment is contingent more on whether the firm’s 
policies and behaviors appear to maximize shareholder benefit and less 
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contingent on the extent to which they have been implemented, suggesting that 
shareholder logic has been institutionalized in the financial community.  
For environment-related CSiR incidents, the audiences are usually 
“green stakeholders”, such as environmental activists, customer or employee 
who care about environmental issues, or local community who are the direct 
victim of environmental-related CSiR incidients. They are generally 
embedded in stakeholder logic (Lamin & Zaheer, 2012). They are concerned 
with balancing the interests of different stakeholders. When they evaluate a 
practice, they take into account its effects on a broader set of stakeholders than 
simply stockholders.  
In this study, we only focus on the audiences who pay attention to 
shareholder related CSiR or environmental related CSiR and whose actions 
may impact firm performance. For instance, shareholder related CSiR 
incidents, such as accounting fraud, violate the legitimate claims of 
shareholders. Therefore, actors in the financial market tend to pay close 
attention to shareholder related CSiR incidents and withhold resources from 
firms involved in. However,  for stakeholders, such as employees, customers, 
or local community, shareholder related CSiR incidents have limited influence 
on their interest. As a result, they are less likely to pay attention to 
shareholder-related CSiR incidents, and thus less likely to withhold their 
support. On the other hand, environment related CSiR incidents tend to attract 
the attention of green stakeholders. For the stakeholders who are insensitive to 
environmental issue, they are unlikely to view environmental related CSiR 
incidents as a issue, and thus unlikely to impact firm performance. Although 
actors in financial markets may pay attention to environment related CSiR 
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incidents as well, they tend to focus on the negative consequence of 
environment related CSiR incidents on firm performance, instead of whether 
firms are social welfare or care for the environment.  
Corporate philanthropy after shareholder-related CSiR incidents 
For audiences of shareholder-related CSiR incidents, firms should be 
managed on the behalf of shareholders, who are the property owners. Their 
view of the appropriate role of the firm in society is one that privileges 
stockholders above other stakeholders (Friedman, 1962). When they interpret 
a given practice or behavior, they focus on whether it will improve efficiency 
and maximize the shareholders’ interests. 
After shareholder-related CSiR incidents, the audiences—who are the 
actors in the financial community—expect the firm to identify its corporate 
governance problems and improve the relevant mechanisms to reduce agency 
cost, protect shareholder benefits, and prevent shareholder-related CSiR 
incidents from recurring. For instance, after financial restatement, firms tend 
to dismiss top executives or directors under pressure from the financial 
community (Kang, 2008). 
Corporate philanthropy is inconsistent with the financial community’s 
expectations after CSiR incidents. First, corporate philanthropy itself may 
represent an agency problem within the firm. For actors in the financial 
community, corporate philanthropy stems from top managers’ desire to 
enhance their personal reputations within their social circles or to further 
political or career agendas at the expense of shareholders (Friedman, 1970). 
Second, in addition to its direct cost, corporate philanthropy also diversifies 
valuable corporate resources, such as cash, inventory, human resources, and 
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facilities (Choi & Wang, 2005; Brammer and Millington, 2003; McWilliams 
& Siegel, 2001; Saiia et al., 2003), which could be used to address CSiR 
incidents within the firm to prevent shareholder-related CSiR incidents from 
recurring. These additional costs represent an agency cost that reduces the 
firm’s value and shareholder wealth (Brown, Helland, & Smith, 2006). 
Therefore, corporate philanthropy violates shareholder’s expectations for the 
firm’s behavior after CSiR incidents.  
Although corporate philanthropy demonstrates a firm’s concern for 
social welfare and helps the firm establish better relations with other 
stakeholders, it is inconsistent with the shareholder logic held by the audience 
for shareholder-related CSiR incidents. For these shareholders, analysts, and 
investors, any benefits to stakeholders that arise from socially responsible 
behavior come at the direct expense of firm value (Friedman, 1970). Finance 
literature has shown that increasing a firm’s social responsibility is associated 
with negative future stock returns and declines in firm ROA (Giuli & 
Kostovetsky, 2014). Ioannou and Serafeim (2014) also show that analysts and 
investors who are embedded in shareholder logic tend to have an unfavorable 
opinion of CSR and thus are more likely to make “sell” recommendations for 
firms with high CSR ratings.  
As a result, shareholder-logic audiences are more likely to evaluate 
corporate philanthropy after shareholder-related incidents negatively. They are 
more likely to challenge concealed motives for corporate philanthropy after 
CSiR incidents, viewing it as an agency cost or hypocritical (Zavylova et al., 
2012). Therefore, corporate philanthropy after shareholder-related CSiR 
incidents may backfire. Audiences in the financial markets tend to punish 
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firms that engage in corporate philanthropy after shareholder-related CSiR 
incidents. As a result,  
H1: Corporate philanthropy would strengthen the negative 
relationship between shareholder-related CSiR and the firm’s subsequent 
performance. 
Corporate philanthropy after environment-related CSiR incidents 
Environment-related CSiR incidents violate the green stakeholders’ 
perceptions of firms as corporate citizens. They expect firms to identify the 
source of the pollution and allocate resources to minimize its negative impact. 
They may also expect the firm to adopt green technology and reform its 
internal operating systems to prevent recurring environmental damage 
(Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998).  
When corporate philanthropy is targeted for the individuals who have 
suffered from environment-related CSiR incidents, it directly remedies the 
negative impact. It indicates a firm’s willingness to accept responsibility and 
offer amends to local residents or the local environment (Pfarrer et al., 2008). 
Moreover, when a firm publicizes its intention to compensate local victims for 
their losses, this shows that the firm has acknowledged its wrongdoing and 
signals determination to resolve problems and prevent environment-related 
CSiR incidents from recurring (Elsbach, 1994). As a result, corporate 
philanthropy helps repair legitimacy loss caused by environment-related CSiR 
incidents.  
When corporate philanthropy is targeted at institutions that are not 
directly affected by an environment-related CSiR incident, such as art or 
education, it fails to directly amend for the CSiR incident. However, audiences 
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for environment-related CSiR incidents, such as the green customers, local 
community, and environmental activists, are unlikely to have a negative 
perspective on corporate philanthropy, for two reasons. First, corporate 
philanthropy signals the firm’s concern for social welfare, and is therefore 
consistent with stakeholder logic; stakeholder logic is concerned about the 
firm’s character—whether it is a good citizen and cares about social welfare 
and all types of stakeholders. Corporate philanthropy can indicate a firm’s 
concern for social welfare, and thus partially repair its social reputation (Choi 
& Wang, 2009). Second, since corporate philanthropy conforms to stakeholder 
logic, social activists and the general public tend to view corporate 
philanthropy in a more positive way. They are unlikely to challenge concealed 
motives for corporate philanthropy or view it as ceremonial or hypocritical. 
Instead, they interpret corporate philanthropy as the firm’s determination to 
purge negative influences and focus its energy on renewal (Seeger & Ulmer, 
2001; Pfaffer, Decelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008). Moreover, it may take a 
relatively long time for the firm to identify the source of the pollution, adopt 
green technology, or reform the internal operating system. Before a firm takes 
any of these actions, corporate philanthropy can serve as a positive signal that 
the firm is committed to social welfare and determined to make changes.  
As the audiences, such as social activists, green customers, and local 
community, are unlikely to have negative perspectives on corporate 
philanthropy after environmental related CSiR incidents, it reduces firm’s 
operation uncertainty and helps to regain support from stakeholders. First, the 
positive interpretation of audiences reduces the likelihood of protest or product 
boycott. It may partially neutralize the opposition from social activists who 
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withhold funding, boycott products, or jeopardize the firm’s reputation(Dacin, 
Oliver, & Roy, 2007). Therefore Increasing corporate philanthropy after 
environmental-related CSiR incidents would reduce the uncertainty associated 
with firm’s future sales and returns. The social movement literature suggests 
that protects and boycotts add uncertainty to firm’s future profitability and 
lead to substantial drops in firm’s stock price (King & Soule, 2007). 
Increasing corporate philanthropy after environmental-related CSiR incidents 
would mitigate the negative effect of environmental related CSiR incidents. 
On the other hand, the positive interpretation of audiences helps to repair the 
relationship between firms and stakeholders. After environmental related 
CSiR incidents, firms risk of losing support from stakeholders, such as local 
community or customers who are environmental sensitive. As corporate 
philanthropy after environment related CSiR incidents signals firms’ care for 
social welfare, it helps to repair the relationship between firms and 
stakeholders who are sensitively to environmental related CSiR incidents and 
regain support from them. As a result, corporate philanthropy would mitigate 
the negative relationship between  environmental related CSiR incidents and 
firm performance. 
Actors in the financial markets are another group of stakeholders who 
care about environment related CSiR incidents. The performance loss and 
uncertainty caused by environment related CSiR incidents would hurt the 
welfare of shareholders. As a result, security analysts, investors, and 
shareholders also care about how firms respond to the environment related 
CSiR incidents to maximize profit and shareholder interest. For these actors, 
they are embedded in shareholder logic and view maximizing firm profit as 
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firm’s sole responsibility. Therefore, instead of focusing on whether firms are 
social responsible, actors in the financial markets only care about the cost and 
benefit of firm’s response strategy and whether firm’s response maximizes 
firm’s profit. As for corporate philanthropy after environmental related CSiR 
incidents, it could reduce the uncertainty caused by potential protects or 
boycotts and regain the support from local community, environmental 
sensitive customers, and social activist. Although there could be some cost 
associated with corporate philanthropy, the positive effect of corporate 
philanthropy may outweight those costs. Therefore, actors in the financial 
market tend to have positive interpretation for corporate philanthropy after 
environmental related CSiR incidents.  
Therefore,   
H2: Corporate philanthropy would weaken the negative relationship 
between the environment-related CSiR incident and the firm’s subsequent 
performance. 
DATA AND METHOD 
Sample selection 
The sample in this study is Fortune 500 firms between 1991 and 2006. 
CSiR incidents data were drawn from articles in the Factiva database. Firm 
level data, such as firm Tobin’Q, age, size, ROA (return on assets), and 
industry were obtained from COMPUSTAT.Corporate philanthropy data were 
obtained from the National Directory of Corporate Giving. This database is 
well established and has been used in several stuides( Marquis & Lee,2013; 
Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013). The full sample of this study includes 797 firms and 





The dependent variable is firm performance. I used Tobin’s Q to 
measure firm performance. The variable was led for one year. 
Independent variable 
This study used the number of CSiR incidents to indicate the level of 
CSiR incidents. I measured this variable using the number of lawsuits against 
the firm by stakeholders, such as shareholder, customer, employee, supplier, 
or third party, or regulatory actions against the firm. For lawsuit that lasted for 
more than one year, I viewed it as an independent event in each year. 2 
Shareholder-related CSiR incident refers to the lawsuit or regulation 
violation that hurts shareholder benefit, such as shareholder class lawsuits, 
accounting frauds, information disclosure issues, embezzling, or failure to 
monitor top managers. I calculated the Number of shareholder-related CSiR 
incidents by using the number of shareholder-related CSiR incidents in a given 
year.  
Environment-related CSiR activity refers to cases when firms pollute 
local environment. I  used the number of environment-related CSiR incidents 
in a given year  to measure  Number of environment-related CSiR incidents.  
Corporate philanthropy is a dummy variable. I coded it as 1 when 
firms engage in corporate philanthropy in a given year; otherwise 0.  
Control variables: This study controlled for factors that previous 
research suggested influence firm performance. To account for the impact of 
institutional investors (Walls, Berrone, & Phan, 2012), I measured 
                                                            
2 One possible problem associated with this method is that it may exaggerate the effect of the firms whose lawsuits 
lasted for more than one year. To test whether this method leads to bias in our results, I only count the lawsuit which 
appeared in the newspaper in the first year if the lawsuits last for more than one year and test the hypotheses in this 
study. The results remain unchanged, suggesting the exaggerating concern does not hold in this study. 
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institutional ownership with the percentage of institutional ownership and 
institutional ownership concentration with the Herfindahl index. For firm 
level effect, I controlled firm age, size, performance, and resource slack. I 
measured firm size by log of firm sales.  I controlled financial performance 
through ROA. I considered Firm’s debt ratio to handle firm resource slack. In 
addition, since previous studies found that firms with more advertising and 
R&D are more likely to donate, I controlled firm’s advertisement and R&D 
expenses.  
Firm’s prior corporate philanthropy I controlled whether firms 
donated in previous years to consider the effect of ex ante corporate 
philanthropy. Previous studies found that ex ante corporate philanthropy could 
buffer the negative effect of CSiR incidents. It may impact the effect of ex 
post corporate philanthropy as well.   
I considered the number of prior total CSiR incidents, prior 
shareholder-related CSiR incidents, and prior environment-related CSiR 
incidents in the previous years to handle the effect of previous CSiR incidents. 
I also controlled for other types of CSiR incidents. Customer-related CSiR 
incident refers to the lawsuit or regulation violation that hurts the benefit of 
customers, such as product safety issue, misleading information/advertisement 
to customers. Number of customer-related CSiR incidents is measured by the 
number of customer-related CSiR incidents in a given year. Employee-related 
CSiR incident refers to the lawsuit or regulation violation that hurts the benefit 
of employee, such as age, gender, or race discrimination, work environment 
safety, workplace harassment, illegal layoff and other illegally employment 
practices. Number of employee-related CSiR incidents is measured by the 
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number of employee-related CSiR incidents in a given year. Supplier-related 
CSiR incident refers to the lawsuit or regulation violation that hurts the benefit 
of stakeholders in the value chains, more specifically suppliers. The CSiR 
incidents include contract breach with suppliers, using its market power to 
expropriate the benefit of suppliers. Number of supplier-related CSiR incidents 
is measured by the number of supplier-related CSiR incidents in a given year. 
Analyses 
I employed a fixed-effect model to predict firm performance. A fixed-
effect model is statistically equivalent to a change score model and removes 
all between-firm differences. It makes the fixed effect model particularly 
suitable for situations such as ours, where the main interest is the change of 
firm performance after the disclosure of CSiR incidents. 
I conducted a Hausman test to further check the appropriateness of 
using fixed effect model. Since the result of Hausman test rejects the null 
hypothesis that the results of random effect model and fixed effect model are 
same, it suggests that unobserved firm level heterogeneity is related to 
corporate philanthropy. The Hausman test indicates the fixed effect model is 
an appropriate choice. 
I further conducted a Breusch-Pagan LM test to check the error 
structure of the data. The result strongly rejected homoskedasticity. Therefore, 





Table 7 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 Mean S.D 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1.Tobin’s  Q 1.40 1.48     
2.Philanthropy(dummy) .21 .40 -.003     
3.No. of CSiR  .14 .60 .05 .07     
4.No. of shareholder-related CSiR .03 .19 -.02 .02 .42     
5.No. of environment-related CSiR .01 .11 -.02 .03 .25 .01     
6.No. of customer-related CSiR .05 .36 .02 .05 .74 .08 .02     
7.No. of employee -related CSiR .02 .15 .01 .04 .43 .09 .08 .13     
8.No. of supply- related CSiR .01 .08 .03 .03 .23 .05 .02 .05 .05     
9.SRI fund ownership .06 .05 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00    
10.Voting rate for the Democratic Party .45 .05 .08 .07 .05 .03 .00 .03 .03 .00 .00   
11.Previous philanthropy(dummy) .47 .50 -.02 .31 .10 .05 .02 .08 .06 .02 .00 .10   
12.Previous CSiR(dummy) .29 .46 .06 .11 .23 .13 .05 .14 .12 .05 .00 .06 .28   
13.Previous shareholder- related CSiR(dummy) .32 .47 .07 .12 .31 .12 .13 .19 .17 .11 .00 .07 .27 .94   
14.Previous environment-related CSiR(dummy) .05 .22 -.03 .07 .08 .03 .12 .02 .08 .03 .00 .01 .16 .34 .36   
15.Firm sale(ln) 8.04 1.36 -.04 .23 .26 .10 .07 .19 .15 .06 .00 .10 .39 .33 .32 .19   
16.Firm asset(ln) 8.14 1.65 -.11 .23 .25 .13 .05 .19 .13 .05 .00 .11 .40 .32 .31 .16 .83   
17.Firm age 28.56 16.69 -.09 .20 .06 -.02 .05 .07 .04 .02 .00 .08 .42 .24 .24 .22 .34 .03   
18.roa .04 .42 .23 .00 .00 -.01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .02 .01 .01 .00 .06 -.03 .30   
19.Institutional ownership .59 .21 .004 .05 -.02 .00 -.02 .00 -.02 .01 .06. .06 .06 .00 .24 .18 .15 -.01 .18 -.38   
20.Institutional ownership concentration .07 .09 -.09 -.11 -.06 -.02 -.03 -.03 -.02 -.03 .00 -.03 -.19 -.06 -.05 -.05 -.32 .00 -.13 -.33 -.38   
21.R&D expense (ln) 1.65 2.37 .25 .14 .19 .05 .04 .16 .04 .03 .00 .17 .23 .23 .22 .11 .25 .01 .27 .17 .11 -.15  




Table7 presents descriptive statistics and correlations for all studied 
variables. The no. of total CSiR incidents is highly correlated to the number of 
shareholder-related CSiR incidents, and the number of customer-related CSiR 
incidents. To avoid multicollinearity problem, I tested the the number of total 
CSiR incidents and the number of shareholder-related CSiR incidents in 
separate models. 
Table8 presents the fixed effect model predicting firm performance. 
Model1 is the baseline model for the effect of total number of CSiR incidents. 
In Model2, including the total number of CSiR incidents and corporate 
philanthropy improves the overall model fit(d.f.=1,p<.01). In Model3, adding 
the interaction with the total number of CSiR incidents and corporate 
philanthropy. There is no significant improvement of overall model fit. 
Model4 is the baseline model for the effect of different types of CSiR 
incidents and their interaction with corporate philanthropy. Adding the number 
of different types of CSiR incidents and corporate philanthropy to Model5 
increases the model fitting significantly. Model6 and Model 7 include the 
interaction term of corporate philanthropy and shareholder-related incidents, 
and the interaction term of corporate philanthropy and environment-related 
incidents, respectively. The inclusion of the interaction term improves the 
model fitting to Model5. Model8 is the full model. Table8 presents the how 
the embeddedness in the shareholder logic and the stakeholder logic impact 
the moderating role of corporate philanthropy.  
Model2 shows that the number of CSiR incidents is negative 
associated with firm’s Tobin’s Q(β=-.023, p<-.001). It suggests that, keeping 
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other variables constant, one more CSiR incident discolsed by mass media 
makes firm’s Tobin’s Q dropping 0.23 in the next year. This finding supports 
our argument that a firm’s performance decreases if it experienced more CSiR 
incidents.  
Existing literature provide two opposite predictions on the moderating 
role of corporate philanthropy on the relationship between CSiR incidents and 
Tobin’s Q. While some studies suggest an enhanced role of corporate 
philanthropy, others propose an offsetting role. The results in Model3 show 
that the coefficient of the interaction between corporate philanthropy and the 
number of CSiR incidents are not significant. This finding supports neither of 
the two streams. 
H1 predicted that the corporate philanthropy would amplify the 
negative relationship between the nubmer of shareholder-related CSiR 
incidents and firm performance. The results in Model 6 indicate that the 
coefficient of the interaction term between corporate philanthropy and 
shareholder-related CSiR incidents are negative and marginally signficant(β= -
0.18;p<.1). This result suggests that, keeping other variables instance, for 
every one more shareholder-holder related CSiR incident disclosed by the 
mass media, the Tobin’s Q of the firm when it engaged in corporate 
philanthropy after the incident would be 0.18 lower than that without 
corporate philanthropy.  
The results in Model 7 support H2, which hypothesized that corporate 
philanthropy would weaken the negative relationship between environment-
related CSiR incidents and firm performance. The results in Model7 support 
this hypothesis. The coefficient of the interaction between corporate 
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philanthropy and environment-related CSiR incidents are positive and 
significant (β=0.13;p<.05). This result indicates, for the same firm, keeping 
other variables constant, for every one more environment-related CSiR 
incidents disclosed by the mass media, when the firm engages in corporate 
philanthropy, the Tobin’s Q of firm would be 0.13 higher than that without 
corporate philanthropy.   
The results in Model6 and Model7 also explain why corporate 
philanthropy has no effect on the relationship between CSiR incidents and 
firm performance. While corporate philanthropy could dampen the negative 
effect of environment-related CSiR incidents, it amplifies the negative impact 
of shareholder-related CSiR incidents. When putting the different types of 
CSiR incidents together, the role of corporate philanthropy becomes non-
significant. This result also echoes the calling in CSR or CSiR research to 
disaggregate CSR or CSiR incidents into different dimensions.  
Further tests 
I conducted further analyses to ensure that sample composition and 
alternative measures did not bias our results. First, I examined whether our 
unbalanced panel could introduce sample bias. I estimated the same model 
over the subsamples of long-staying groups: those that existed in all 16 time 
points and those exist in at least 10 time points. The findings are consistent 
with those reported above. Second, I used alternative measurements to check 
the robustness of the results in this study. To check the robustness of using 
number of CSiRs as dependent variables, I used the number of articles on 
CSiR and the total number of words on CSiR as dependent variables. The 
results still hold. I used the continuous  measurement of corporate 
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philanthropy to capture the effect of corporate philanthropy. The results 
remain unchanged when I  used the amount of money firms spent on corporate 
philanthropy. I also used market value to measure firm’s financial 
performance. The results maintain though less significant.  
To further support the mechanism tested in the hypothesis, I also 
examined audience’s embededness in shareholder logic or stakeholders and 
how the embeddedness impacts the role of corporate philanthropy.  
To examine the robustness of H1, I examined shareholder’s 
embeddedness in shareholder logic. If H1 is true, then the amplifying role of 
corporate philanthropy is weaker when audiences in financial markets have 
lower embeddedness in shareholder logic.  In the discussion of H1, I assume 
that audiences in the stock market are embedded in the shareholder logic. 
However, recent studies have found the coexistence or even the hybrid of the 
shareholder and the stakeholder logic in the stock market. For instance, SRI 
(social responsible investment) funds, tend to choose financial investment on 
the basis of social responsibility criteria. For these mutual funds, they are more 
likely to embed in the stakeholder perspective. They believe that caring for 
stakeholders associated with higher costs in the long run, it may have a 
positive effect on the firm’s long term performance. For these SRI investors, 
they are less likely to have a negative view of the firm’s ex post corporate 
philanthropy. They are more likely to view corporate philanthropy as the 
firm’s efforts to improve social performance. Therefore, they are less likely to 
have negative evaluation of the corporate philanthropy after the shareholder-
related CSiR incidents. To measure shareholder’s embeddedness in 
shareholder logic, I used the pencent of outstanding shares hold by SRI funds. 
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I obtained the social responsible fund list from www.ussif.org and then 
merged with mutual ownership data and institutional ownership data provided 
by Thomson Reuters. 
The results in Mode9 support the arguments that the strengthen role of 
corporate philanthropy would be weaker if firms have higher SRI ownership. 
The coefficient of SRI ownership’s interaction with corporate philanthropy, 
and the number. of shareholder-related incidents is marginal positive(β=2.57, 
p<.1). To further examine the moderating role of SRI ownership, I classified 
firms into two groups, firms with higher SRI ownership and firms with lower 
SRI ownership. The results in the Model10 and Model11 show that when 
firms have lower SRI ownership, corporate philanthropy amplifies the 
negative relationship between shareholder-related CSiR incidents and Tobin’s 
Q, while corporate philanthropy has no effect when firms have higher SRI 
ownership.   
To examine the robustness of H2, I examined the local community’s 
embeddedness in stakeholder logic. If H2 is true, then the offsetting role of 
corporate philanthropy is stonger when local residents have higher 
embeddedness in stakeholder logic.  Political preference is a natural measure 
of a local community to be embedded in the shareholder or stakeholder logic. 
Democratic Party and Republican party are two dominant parties in the US. 
Each party has its policies and philosophy. The Democratic Party platform 
places more emphasis on stakeholder related issues such as environmental 
protection, anti-discrimination laws and affirmative action, employee 
protection, and helping the poor and disadvantaged. A 2007 national 
consumers league survey found that 96% of Democrats believe congress 
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should ensure that companies address social issues, compared to 65% of 
Republicans. However, the Republican Party is more emphasis on means to 
improve firm profit. It highlights cutting taxes to improve the firm profit and 
views the growth of the economy as the way to resolve the social welfare issue. 
It is more consistent with the shareholder logic of firms. Therefore, the voting 
pattern of the local community would reflect the local community’s 
embeddedness in shareholder or stakeholder logic (Giuli & Kosveskey, 2014). 
The more residents supporting the Democratic Party reflect higher 
embeddedness in the stakeholder logic(Giuli & Kostovesky, 2014). To capture 
local community’s embeddedness in stakeholder logic, I averaged the 
supporting rate for the Democratic presidential candidate in a state from 1964 
to 2004(Rubin, 2008; Giuli & Kostovetsky, 2014). 
The results in Mode13 and Model14 provide some support to our 
robustness check. When classifying firms into two groups: firms from states 
with higher Democratic supporting rate and from lower supporting rate, the 
coefficient of the interaction between corporate philanthropy and 
environment-related CSiR incidents are marginal positive when firms  operate 
in Democratic-leaning states, while the coefficient of the interaction is non-










Table 8 Predicting Firm’s Tobin’s Q Using Fixed Effect Model, Fortune 
500 firms, 1991-2006 
     
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8
No. of CSiR    0.11   
    *corporate philanthropy   (0.09)   
No.of shareholder-related CSiR   -0.18†  -0.18†
    * corporate philanthropy   (0.10)  (0.10)
No.of environment-related   0.13* 0.13*
 CSiR* corporate philanthropy   (0.07) (0.07)
Corporate philanthropy  -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00
(dummy)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
No of CSiR  -0.23*** -0.25***   
  (0.06) (0.07)   
No.of shareholder-related    -0.28** -0.22** -0.28** -0.22**
     CSiR incidents   (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
No.of environment-related   0.10 0.10 0.04 0.04
     CSiR incidents   (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
No.of customer-related   -0.20* -0.21* -0.20* -0.21*
     CSiR incidents   (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
No.of employee-related   -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01
     CSiR incidents   (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
No.of supply-related   -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
     CSiR incidents   (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Previous corporate -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
     philanthropy (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Previous CSiR -0.18 -0.21 -0.21 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
      (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Previous shareholder-related   -0.30** -0.27* -0.27* -0.27* -0.27*
     CSiR incidents   (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Previous environment-related   -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
     CSiR incidents   (0.09) (0.10) (0. 10)) (0. 10)) (0. 10))
Firm sales(ln) 0.23** 0.23** 0.23** 0.24** 0.23** 0.23** 0.23** 0.23**
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Firm asset(ln) -0.49*** -0.47*** -0.47*** -0.49*** -0.48*** -0.48*** -0.48*** -0.48***
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Firm age 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03**
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ROA 2.25*** 2.27*** 2.27*** 2.26*** 2.28*** 2.27*** 2.28*** 2.27***
 (0.46) (0.45) (0.45) (0.46) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45)
Institutional ownership 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Ownership concentration -0.89** -0.80** -0.80** -0.85** -0.78* -0.78* -0.78* -0.78*
 (0.31) (0.30) (0.30) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
Debt ratio -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
R&D(ln) -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Advertisement(ln) -0.04* -0.03* -0.03* -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* -0.04*
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 2.54*** 2.39*** 2.39*** 2.49*** 2.43*** 2.43*** 2.43*** 2.43***
 (0.49) (0.47) (0.47) (0.48) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47)
 .675 .680 .680 .676 .679 .679 .679  
R-square .675 .680 .680 .676 .679 .679 .679 .679
Likelihood-ratio test vs.Model1  131.97 135.36 57.64 60.65 58.27 61.33
Degree of Freedom  2 3 6 7 7 8 
Note: Observation number=8561; Firm number=797; Year and Industry Dummy included; 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<.1. 
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Table 9 Predicting Firm's Tobin's Q Using Fixed Effect Model, Fortune 







  Low High Low High 
 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12 Model13 Model14 
   
No.of shareholder-related CSiR 2.57†  
* corporate philanthropy 
*SRI fund ownership 
(1.53)  
SRI fund ownership -1.42**  
 (0.53)  
No.of shareholder-related CSiR -0.40* -0.39* 0.04  
    * corporate philanthropy (0.18) (0.18) (0.10)  
No.of shareholder-related CSiR  -2.01  
* corporate philanthropy 
* Democratic voting rate 
 (1.165)  
No.of environment-related  1.06 -0.05 0.15† 
 CSiR* corporate philanthropy  (0.552) (0.143) (0.085) 
Corporate philanthropy 0.00 0.01 -0.05* -0.01 -0.03 0.01 
(dummy) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.021) (0.028) (0.027) 
No.of shareholder-related  -0.23** -0.10 -0.20* -0.28** -0.11 -0.29** 
     CSiR incidents (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.086) (0.068) (0.100) 
No.of environment-related 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.05 
     CSiR incidents (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.066) (0.082) (0.093) 
No.of customer-related -0.19* -0.20 -0.06 -0.20* -0.25 -0.19* 
     CSiR incidents (0.09) (0.12) (0.05) (0.083) (0.159) (0.089) 
No.of employee-related 0.00 -0.10 0.05 -0.00 0.14 0.01 
     CSiR incidents (0.05) (0.08) (0.04) (0.052) (0.149) (0.055) 
No.of supply-related -0.02 0.11 -0.00 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 
     CSiR incidents (0.10) (0.14) (0.08) (0.104) (0.080) (0.135) 
Previous corporate 0.00 0.01 -0.09 -0.01 0.09 -0.05 
     philanthropy (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.068) (0.068) (0.091) 
Previous CSiR -0.31* -0.38 -0.30** -0.28* -0.05 -0.36* 
      (0.14) (0.23) (0.11) (0.125) (0.121) (0.158) 
Previous shareholder-related 0.05 0.11 0.06 0.01 0.09 -0.01 
     CSiR incidents (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.070) (0.097) (0.085) 
Previous environment-related -0.01 -0.00 0.20 0.02 -0.02 0.01 
     CSiR incidents (0.09) (0.12) (0.17) (0.095) (0.130) (0.113) 
Firm sales(ln) 0.23** 0.18* 0.47*** 0.23** 0.09 0.36* 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.074) (0.058) (0.145) 
Firm asset(ln) 2.27*** 2.96*** 1.18** 2.28*** 1.64*** 2.36*** 
 (0.45) (0.64) (0.38) (0.451) (0.413) (0.569) 
Firm age 0.04** 0.03* 0.03** 0.03** 0.02* 0.04* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.011) (0.007) (0.016) 
ROA 0.24 0.08 0.60** 0.18 0.08 0.18 
 (0.18) (0.20) (0.19) (0.180) (0.181) (0.248) 
Institutional ownership -0.46*** -0.32** -0.76*** -0.48*** -0.26*** -0.63*** 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.16) (0.071) (0.068) (0.106) 
Ownership concentration -0.71* -0.25 -2.63*** -0.78* -1.04*** -0.73 
 (0.28) (0.31) (0.71) (0.309) (0.309) (0.417) 
Debt ratio -0.06 0.05 0.50 -0.06 -0.24 -0.07 
 (0.24) (0.25) (0.39) (0.267) (0.329) (0.340) 
R&D(ln) -0.03 0.04 -0.06 -0.05 0.06 -0.07 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.045) (0.039) (0.044) 
Advertisement(ln) -0.04* -0.05* -0.02 -0.04* 0.00 -0.05* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.017) (0.031) (0.018) 
Constant 2.22*** 1.54** 2.28*** 2.43*** 2.11*** 2.52** 
 (0.47) (0.51) (0.57) (0.473) (0.290) (0.770) 
   
Observations 7,956 4,813 3,143 8,503 2,423 6,080 
Number of firmid 768 690 565 790 232 558 
R-squared .688 .719 .805 .679 .671 .746 
                     Note: Year and Industry Dummy included; Robust standard errors in parentheses;  









CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
The findings provide support for the theoretical arguments in this study. 
I argue that whether corporate philanthropy could offset or enhance the 
negative effect of CSiR incidents on firm performance depends on the 
institutional logic stakeholders embedded in. Stakeholders embedded in 
stakeholder logic tend to have view corporate philanthropy as firm’s attempt 
to improve corporate social behavior, while stakeholders embedded in the 
shareholder logic view corporate philanthropy as an agency cost. Since the 
audiences of shareholder-related CSiR incidents, such as shareholders, are 
typically embedded shareholder logic, corporate philanthropy would 
strengthen the negative relationship between shareholder-related CSiR 
incidents and firm performance. On the other hand, as the audience of 
environment-related CSiR, such as local residents, are generally embedded in 
stakeholder logic, corporate philanthropy could partially offset the negative 
effect of environment-related CSiR incidents.  
This study enriches legitimacy repair literature by linking institutional 
logics to examine the effect of firm’s response strategies. Although literatures 
on literature repair have identified several ways to repair firm legitimacy, we 
are unclear about the effectiveness of each strategy under different conditions. 
One of exception is Lamin & Zaheer(2012)’s study, which suggest that Wall 
street and main street have different response to firm’s legitimacy repair 
strategies after international sweatshop scandals. Among the four response 
strategies, denial, defiance, decoupling, and acknowledge, Wall Street 
preferred decoupling, while Main Street responded negatively to denial and 
defiance. In this study, drawing on institutional logic literature, I examine how 
the coexistence of two institutional logics leads to the variance in actors’ 
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interpretation to corporate philanthropy, another legitimacy repair strategy. I 
argue that the effect of corporate philanthropy depend on higher-level 
institutional logics actors embedded in. I find that while corporate 
philanthropy could repair the legitimacy loss after environment-related CSiR 
incidents, it would backfire and hinder the legitimacy repair for shareholder-
related CSiR incidents.  
This study also contributes to CSR and CSI literature in several ways. 
First, this study furthers our understanding of the linkage between CSR and 
CSI. Previous studies always highlight the buffering or insurance role of 
corporate philanthropy ex ante irresponsible behaviors, we are unclear the ex 
post role of corporate philanthropy. In this study, I examine the performance 
implication of ex post corporate philanthropy. Instead of discussing whether 
corporate philanthropy could mitigate the negative impact of CSiR incidents 
or not, I argue that the effect of corporate philanthropy depends on higher-
level institutional logics actors embedded in. This study provides a more 
complete picture of the linkage between CSR, more specifically corporate 
philanthropy, and CSI. 
Second, this study contributes to corporate social irresponsibility 
literature by disaggregating CSiR incidents to different types. Similar to CSR 
studies, existing CSI studies tend to aggregate different types or dimension of 
CSiR incidents in the same category. One problem of using a single construct 
to measure CSR or CSI is that it ignores the variances among different 
components or dimensions within CSR or CSI (Johnson, & Greening, 
1999;Hillman & Keim, 2001. Therefore, to better understand CSI, in this work, 
I focus on two different types of CSiR incidents: shareholder-related incidents 
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and environment-related CSiR incidents. The findings in this work also 
support the idea of disaggregating CSiR incidents. This work suggests that 
corporate philanthropy could amplify the negative relationship between 
shareholder-related CSiR incidents and firm performance, while dampening 
the negative relationship for environment-related CSiR incident. However, 
when aggregating different types of CSiR incidents together, the variance 
disappears and corporate philanthropy has no effect on the relationship 
between the total numbers of CSiR incidents. Future studies should continue 
to follow this trend by examining the variances among different types or 
categories of CSiR incidents. By doing so, it helps us have a better 
understanding of CSI. 
This study also has implications for firms experienced CSiR incidents. 
This study showed that corporate philanthropy helps to offset the negative 
effect of environment-related CSiR but backfires for shareholder-related CSiR 
incidents. Therefore, firms should selectively choose different response 
strategies after CSiR incidents.  
One avenue for future research inspired by the present study is an 
exploration of the importance of fit between different types of response 
strategies and categories of CSiR incidents. Legitimacy repair and reputation 
rebuild literature has identified many different types of strategies, such as 
verbal account, replacing executives, and adding watchdog. However, we are 
unclear about the effectiveness of different strategies and their fit to CSiR 
incidents. More studies are required in this direction. 
This study is not without limit. First, the measurement of corporate 
philanthropy is relatively coarse-grained. I used a dummy variable to measure 
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firm’s corporate philanthropy behavior. This method may loss many useful 
information related to corporate philanthropy. For instance, as the target of 
corporate philanthropy differs, the effect of corporate philanthropy varies. For 
instance, donation towards local community or environment-related issues 
would dampen the negative effect of environment-related CSiR incidents, 
while donation toward employees or art may have a weaker offsetting effect. 
Therefore, future studies could focus on the target of corporate philanthropy 
and its fit with different types of CSiR incidents. Second, the sample in this 
study is the large Fortune 500 firms, which may lead to sample selection bias. 

















CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this dissertation, I try to examine the linkage between firm’s social 
responsible practice and irresponsible practice. Existing literature tends to 
focus on either social responsible practice, such as CSR, environmental 
performance, or corporate philanthropy, or social irresponsible practices, such 
as negative events or scandals. In this study, instead of focusing on neither 
CSR nor CSiR, I try to establish a linkage between these two lines of literature. 
To address this issue, I ask several interrelated research questions and, using a 
longtitudinal sample of Fortune 500 firms from 1991 to 2006, answer the 
questions in two separate easssays. 
First, in the Essay One, I ask: Do firms increase CSR because of their 
CSiR behaviors? Why they do so? Which firms are most likely to do so?  
The results show that firms did increase corporate philanthropy after 
CSiR incidents. I view corporate philanthropy, an important component of 
CSR, as a coping or response strategy after CSiR incidents. More specifically, 
it is an impression management tactic to reconcile the conflicting demands of 
internal managers and external stakeholders. After CSiR incidents, while 
external stakeholders expect firms to take actions to prevent CSiR incidents 
from reocurrance, internal managers might resist to such changes. Corporate 
philanthropy shows firm’s care for social welfare. By increasing corporate 
philanthropy, firms expect to deflect external stakeholders’ attention from the 
CSiR incidents and thus mitigate external pressure. On the other hand, it has 
no effect on firms’ internal operation and thus favored by internal managers. 
Firms are mostly likely to use corporate philanthropy as a response strategy 
when the pressure from external stakeholders and internal managers are both 
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high. The results support my argument and show that firms are mostly likely 
to do so when the CSiR incidents hurt the interest of shareholders and when 
TMT members have longer organizational tenure. 
The Essay Two is a follow up study of Essay 1, and I ask what’s the 
performance implication of increasing corporate philanthropy after CSiR 
behaviors? 
The results indicate that institutional logics shape how stakeholders 
interpret corporate philanthropy after CSiR incidents and thus impact the 
effect of coporate philanthropy. Actors embedded in shareholder logic tend to 
interpret the corporate philanthropy after CSiR incidents as a consequence of 
agency cost or hypocricity behaviors, while actors embedded in stakeholder 
logic tend to have more positive interpration of corporate philanthropy, 
viewing it firm’s determination to change. To explore the effect of two 
institutional logics, I focus on shareholder-related CSiR incidents and 
environment-related CSiR incidents. The audiences of the two types of CSiR 
incidents are embedded in shareholder logic and stakeholder logic respectively. 
I find that corporate philanthropy would amplify the negative relationship 
between shareholder-related CSiR incidents and firm’s Tobin’s Q. However, 
corporate philanthropy after environment-related CSiR incidents would 
dampen the negative effect of environment-related CSiR.  
DISCUSSIONS 
This thesis examines corporate philanthropy ex post corporate social 
irresponsible incidents. I focus on the linkage between corporate irresponsible 
behaviors and ex post corporate philanthropy of Fortune 500 firms for 11 year.  
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The two essays in this thesis are from two different perspectives. The 
Essay One is from the perspective of firms. It examines how do firms response 
to stakeholders when their social irresponsible incidents were disclosed or 
discovered by mass media. The Essay Two is from the view of stakeholders. 
When firms use corporate philanthropy as a response strategy, how do 
stakeholders evaluate such behavior and how does this strategy impact firm 
performance.  
The results in the Essay One and the Essay Two indicate the deviation 
of firm’s perception and stakeholder’s reaction. While firms respond to the 
different stakeholders based on their dependence on the stakeholders, the 
stakeholders evaluate firm’s behaviors based on the institutional logics they 
embedded in. I found that while firms are more likely to increase corporate 
philanthropy after shareholder-related CSiR incidents, audiences in the 
financial community tend to publish such behavior. On the other hand, firms 
are unlikely to respond to environment-related CSiR incidents, while 
increasing corporate philanthropy after environment-related CSiR incidents 
helps mitigate CSiR incidents’ negative impact on firm performance. The 
findings in this thesis suggest that when responding to CSiR incidents, firms 
need to consider the perception and preference of different stakeholders. The 
results also highlight the need of matching of response strategy to the 
preference of different stakeholders.  
This thesis makes several theoretical contributions to legitimacy repair 
legitimacy literature, CSR literature, and CSI literature. First, this thesis 
considers the resistance from internal managers in firm’s choice of legitimacy 
repair strategy. Existing legitimacy repair literature always highlights the 
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demands from external stakeholders, overlooking the possible resistance from 
internal managers. By considering the resistance from internal managers, this 
thesis shows that firms are more likely to increase corporate philanthorpy, a 
practice that show conformity to external stakeholder without change internal 
operation, when the resistance from internal managers are strong.  
Moreover, this thesis also examines the effectiveness of legtimacy 
repair strategy. Corporate philanthropy is increasing viewed as a strategy to 
repair legitimacy. However, the effectiveness of such strategy is unclear. 
Drawing on institutional theory, this thesis argues that the effect of corporate 
philanthropy depend on higher-level institutional logics actors embedded in. I 
find that while corporate philanthropy could repair the legitimacy loss after 
environment-related CSiR incidents, it would backfire and hinder the 
legitimacy repair for shareholder-related CSiR incidents. 
Second, this thesis contributes the CSR and CSI literature by bridging 
the two lines of studies. Recent development in CSR literature has been 
suggested that CSI is not the opposite of CSR. Moreover, firms may engage in 
social responsible and social irresponsible behaviors simultaneously (Bansal, 
Gao, & Strike, 2006). However, existing literature focus on either CSR or CSI, 
few studies examined the linkage between them. Few exceptions examined 
CSR ex ante CSI. However, we have limited understanding of CSR ex post 
CSI. We are unclear about the reasons why firms increase CSR after CSI and 
the performance implication of this practice. This thesis focuses on corporate 
philanthropy, an important component of CSR, and CSI. It shows that firms 
use corporate philanthropy to balance the conflicting demands of internal 
managers and external stakeholders. They are most likely to adopt this strategy 
92 
 
when the CSiR incident is related to shareholders and when TMT members 
have longer tenure. In this case, external pressure and internal resistance are 
strong. Moreover, the effect of corporate philanthropy depends on higher-level 
institutional logics actors embedded in. Corporate philanthropy could dampen 
the negative effect of environment-related CSiR incidents on firm 
performance; it would amplify the negative relationshipo between 
shareholder-related CSiR incidents and firm performance. 
Third, this thesis also contributes to CSI literature by disaggrating it to 
different dimensions. Similar to CSR studies, existing CSI studies tend to 
aggregate different types or dimension of CSiR in the same category. To echo 
the calling of CSR scholars, this thesis disaggregates CSiR into different 
dimensions based on the types of stakeholders whose legtimate claims are 
violated by the CSiR incidents. This thsis suggests that firm’s response 
strategy to different types of CSiR varies. They are more likely to respond to 
CSiR incidents which involved with stakeholders firms have higher resource 
dependence relationship. Moreover,the effect of corporate philanthropy also 
varies for different dimensions of CSiR incidents. It helps to offset the 
negative effect of environment-related CSiR incidents, but amplify the 
negative effect of shareholder-related CSiR incidents.  
LIMITATION 
This thesis consists of several limitations. First, the measurement of 
corporate philanthropy is relatively coarse-grained. The Essay One only 
focuses on the total amount of money firms invested in corporate philanthropy, 
failing to examine the distribution of corporate philanthropy. This method may 
loss many usefully information related to corporate philanthropy. For instance, 
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after CSiR incidents, whether firms distribute the donation to the stakeholders 
whose legitimate claims were violated by the CSiR incidents. In Essay Two, 
the thesis focused on whether firms have corporate philanthropy after CSiR 
incidents, overlooking to the distribution of corporate philanthropy. As the 
target of corporate philanthropy differs, the effect of corporate philanthropy 
varies. Without the distribution data, this thesis fails to examine the fit 
between CSiR incidents and corporation philanthoropy. For instance, after 
environment-related CSiR incidents, corporate philanthropy towards local 
community or environment-related issues would dampen the negative effect of 
CSiR incidents, while donation toward employees or art may have a weaker 
offsetting effect.  
Second, this thesis uses a relative simple categorization method to 
measure the resource relationship between firms and stakeholders. However, 
the resource dependence relationship between firms and stakeholders may 
vary across different firms. For instance, in industries with high market 
competition, firms would have relatively lower dependence on customers. 
This method may ignore the variance of the resource relationship between 
firms and stakeholders. Third, the sample in this thesis is large Fortune 500 
firms. It may give rise to the concern of generalizability problems. The 
findings in this article may not be applied to small firms.  
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTION 
One direction for future CSiR literature is to explore the importance of 
fit between different types of response strategies and categories of CSiR 
incidents. The results in Essay2 show that corporate philanthropy serves as a 
good response strategy for environment-related CSiR incidents, but a bad 
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strategy for shareholder-related CSiR incidents. The findings indicate the 
effectiveness of a given response strategy may contigent on the features of 
CSiR incidents and stakeholders who involved in the CSiR incidents. 
Legitimacy repair and reputation rebuild literature has identified many 
different types of strategies, such as verbal account, replacing executives, and 
adding watchdog. However, we are unclear about the effectiveness of different 
strategies and their fit to CSiR incidents. More studies are required in this 
direction. 
Another direction is to focus on the distribution of corporate 
philanthropy. Existing studies have a relatively coarse-grained measurement 
of corporate philanthropy, igoring the distribution of corporate philanthropy. 
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Appendix  Codebook for Coding Journal Articles 
Target firm level variables 
Firm name 
Firm id 
No of negative events: total number of negative events 
Report level variables 
Report id 
Negative event: dummy variable. Coded as 1 if the article reported firm’s 
negative event, otherwise 0.  
Sources: 1. Wall Street Journal; 2. New York Times; 3. Washington Post. 
Date of report: in the format of yyyymmdd. For instance, 1st Jan 2010 is coded 
as 20100101.  
No of words 
Type of cases: 1. lawsuit; 2. Regulation violation(investigation by government 
agencies or authorities, such as SEC, FDA, EPA, NCR) 
    Note: 1.lawsuit by government agencies or authorities is coded as1.lawsuit.  
              2. recall is coded as regulation violation. 
Status of the lawsuit: 1. Will suit. 2. Proceeding. 3. Filed; 4. Withdraw; 5. 
Dismiss/reject. 6. Settle; 7 Fined; 8. plead guilty; 9. win; 10. 
Sentenced;11.continue to suit;12.not plead guilty;13. Others 
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   Note:1.Proceeding：After firms filed a lawsuit, any status before a result, 
such as withdraw, dismiss, settle, or fine, could be regarded as proceeding. For 
example, if firms want to or try to settle a lawsuit, the status could be coded as 
proceeding.  
        2.losing the case could be coded as 10,  sentenced. 
        3. Big events always involve a series of cases. For these small cases, code 
the status variable based on the specific report. However, the final status of the 
small cases should be based on the final status of the big event. This is because 
we view these series of cases as one big event.  
Status of regulation violation: 1. Request to disclose more information;2. 
Investigated;3. sentenced; 4.fined;5. Other; 6.settle; 7, forced recall; 8. 
Voluntary recall. 
      Note : recall: The two statuses: forced recall, and Voluntary recall, is 
used to code the feature of  product recall.  The size of product recall 
(product amount, product value, and regions) is recorded in the “amount of 
fines” variable 
Event level variables 
Event id: coded as 1, 2, 3, …  
types of negative event: 1. Shareholder (restatement, back-purchase, financial 
fraud); 2. Customer (product quality, product safety); 3. 
Employee(discrimination, work over time); 4. Suppliers(anti-trust); 5. 
Competitor( anti trust; Patent);6. Pollution;7. Bribery; 8. other social 




Reason: use one or two words to describe the reason of lawsuit 
Name of accuser: note the accuser’s name if it is a company or an institution.  
No of other defendant: The accuser may sue more than one firm. This variable 
refers to the number of other firms who were sued in this particular lawsuit.  
Names of other defendants 
no of articles related to the event 
no of  journals report this event 
Firm’s response to the negative event: use a few words to summarize 
spokesman’s response 
Amount of fines : 
Years in prison: 
Final Status of the lawsuit: 1. Will suit. 2. Proceeding. 3. Filed; 4. Withdraw; 
5. Dismiss/reject. 6. Settle; 7 Fined; 8. plead guilty; 9. win; 10. Sentenced; 11. 
Continue to suit.12.not plead guilty; 13. Others 
Final Status of regulation violation: 1. Request to disclose more information;2. 
Investigated; 3. Sentenced;4.fined;5. Others—6.settle. 7, forced recall; 8. 
Voluntary recall 
Firm or executive: coded as 1 if the lawsuit is against firm’s executives, ex-
executives,; otherwise, coded as 0 if the lawsuit is again firm. 
 
